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DOES PLAINTIFF EXCLUSION HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY NEGLIGENCE LITIGATION?
Giuseppe A. Ippolitot
PART I: INTRODUCTION
You're a doctor who delivered a child with severe birth
defects. The child's parents decide that you injured the child
during delivery, and sue you for malpractice.' At trial, the child's
attorney wheels the child into the courtroom, and the child looks
blankly at the bench, unaware of what is happening.2 The jurors
gasp, concluding that you must be guilty because injuries that
severe just don't happen by accident . You trot out all manner of
medical studies and legal doctrines proving your case, but the jury
t J.D. (2005), University at Buffalo Law School, State University of New York;
M.B.A. (2002), Canisius College; B.S. / B.A., summa cum laude (1998),
Canisius College. This article won first place in the seventh annual Health Law
Writing Competition, sponsored by Epstein, Becker, & Green, P.C. Thanks to
Andrew Connelly, Erik Goergen, Kate Knauf, Leah Szumach, and Prof. James
Wooten for timely suggestions. Special thanks to Prof. Laura Reilly for her
boundless enthusiasm for this project. I dedicate this article to Paul S.
Naumann, S.J., my Senior Honors English teacher at Canisius High School, who
always exhorted me to write in "finely chiseled English prose," and always
suffered "psychic lacerations" when I did not.
1 This article will not address exclusion of a plaintiff with pre-existing or
otherwise unrelated conditions and injuries. See Francis M. Dougherty,
Annotation, Physical Condition of Plaintiff in Personal Injury Action as
Affecting Right to be Present at Trial, 27 A.L.R. 4th 583 § 1 n. 1 (2004) (making
the same distinction when summarizing cases that have addressed plaintiff
exclusion).
2 See, e.g., Reems v. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 536 N.W.2d 666, 668
(N.D. 1995) (affirming exclusion from the liability phases of trial of a plaintiff
who, according to her physicians, could aspire to little more in life than "to learn
to smile, to sit up in a wheelchair and to be able to hold her own head").
3 See, e.g., Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Cloud, 569 N.E.2d 983, 991 (Ind. App. 1991)
(noting, in a case stemming from a severe automobile accident, that "we refuse
to believe that the jurors from Clark County, Indiana are made of such stone
they can reasonably be expected to detach their emotions from the horrible
tragedy suffered by Toni Cloud and her family during their deliberations on the
issue of liability").
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doesn't follow you. 4 Your abstract defenses sound academic and
4 Compare Matthew A. Sokol, Cary v. Oneok, Inc.: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Upholds Plaintiff's Right to Attend Trial, 19 PACE L. REV. 195, 211 (1998)
("Despite the criticisms, [a] basic assumption of the law has been that the jury
can understand the case presented to it. Further, jury proponents believe that
jurors are smarter than assumed by lawyers working from manuals.") (internal
quotation marks omitted) with Edward L. Holloran, III, Medical Malpractice
Litigation in Florida: Discussion of Problems and Recommendations, 26 NOVA
L. REV. 331, 343 (2001) ("[T]he law seeks the benefit of the common person's
judgment but asks that individual to apply legal rules often beyond the
comprehension of one not trained in the law.") (internal quotation marks
omitted). Aside from legal issues, lawsuits involving science and technology
also can present complex factual issues that a reasonable jury cannot resolve
without resorting to irrelevant or prejudicial emotions or outside personal
experiences. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d
1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980) ("A suit is too complex for a jury when circumstances
render the jury unable to decide in a proper manner. The law presumes that a
jury will find facts and reach a verdict by rational means. It does not
contemplate scientific precision but does contemplate a resolution of each issue
on the basis of a fair and reasonable assessment of the evidence and a fair and
reasonable application of the relevant legal rules. A suit might be excessively
complex as a result .of any set of circumstances which singly or in combination
render a jury unable to decide in the foregoing rational manner. Examples of
such circumstances are an exceptionally long trial period and conceptually
difficult factual issues.") (citation omitted); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 447-48 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("Throughout the trial, the
court felt that the jury was having trouble grasping the concepts that were being
discussed by the expert witnesses, most of whom had doctorate degrees in their
specialties. This perception was confirmed when the court questioned the jurors
during the course of their deliberations and after they were discharged. When
asked by the court whether a case of this type should be tried to a jury, the
foreman of the jury said, 'If you can find a jury that's both a computer
technician, a lawyer, an economist, knows all about that stuff, yes, I think you
could have a qualified jury, but we don't know anything about that.' Several of
the other jurors indicated that they thought that the major stumbling block was
the requirement that the verdict be unanimous. When they were questioned after
the trial, most of the jurors indicated that they thought a complex antitrust case
like this one should be tried to the court.") (citation omitted). But see In re U.S.
Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Not only do we refuse to
read a complexity exception into the Seventh Amendment, but we also express
grave reservations about whether a meaningful test could be developed were we
to find such an exception. Where would the courts draw the line between those
cases which are, and those which are not, too complex for a jury? The court
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hypertechnical, compared to the descriptions of the child suffering
in front of the jury's own eyes. Ultimately, the jurors follow their
instincts and steel themselves to find a way to help the poor child.5
Defendants in negligence litigation dread the due process
nightmare that the above scenario describes. Whenever defendants
have to argue that they have not caused the injuries of plaintiffs
with severe physical and mental injuries, they risk sounding as if
they suggest that plaintiffs have exaggerated the extent of their
suffering. Increased consumer or patient expectations of safety
and success also affect defendants in negligence litigation.
6
below found that the complexity of the present case was created primarily by the
accounting and financial nature of the issues and evidence. The appellees
generally assume that only antitrust and securities cases could qualify for the
complexity exception. We acknowledge the complicated nature of the evidence
and issues associated with the accounting and financial questions involved in
antitrust and securities cases. Yet, almost all tax cases also involve the same
type of evidence and issues; does this then mean that there should not be a right
to jury trial in this broad class of cases as well?").
5 See Holloran, supra note 4, at 353-54 ("Together with their retained experts,
attorneys present scientific evidence so far beyond the comprehension of
average jurors that jurors often accept what is being said as true and give
plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
In addition to finding liability based on misunderstood evidence and
instructions, a jury that decides that a physician defendant acted recklessly may
impose punitive damages. See Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Allowance of
Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice Action, 35 A.L.R. 5th 145 (2005)
(surveying those cases in which juries awarded punitive damages in medical
malpractice actions). Determinations of punitive damages can be even more
subjective or confusing than determinations of liability, since juries have very
few standards by which to assess an appropriate award. See generally CASS R.
SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE (2002)
(demonstrating through experiments how psychological, economic, and other
biases can lead jurors to ignore judges' instructions and influence the legal
questions before them).
A court can declare a product unreasonable if reasonable consumer
expectations rise sufficiently higher than industry standards. See, e.g., McAlpin
v. Elec. Furnace Co., No. 95-0758-R, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12618, at *9-10
(W.D. Va. Aug. 9, 1996).
2004-2005
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal
Manufacturers need to try harder than ever to anticipate side
effects from the use of their products. In the medical field, some
procedures always will carry the risk of severe injury, no matter
how many precautions the health providers take. Unfortunately,
however, modem medicine has become a victim of its own
success,7 with patients suing based on adverse outcomes and not
necessarily based on provider misconduct. These suits, which
proceed more often in front of a jury than a judge, 8 provide juries
an opportunity to confuse whether defendants did anything that
they ought not to have done-the liability phase of a trial-with
how badly they hurt the plaintiffs in question-the damages phase
of a trial. 9 Juries can compound this potential confusion if they
7 See, e.g., Holloran, supra note 4, at 332 ("Perhaps one of the largest
contributors to the rise in medical malpractice litigation is due to modem
achievements in medicine. Indeed, physicians may have become the victims of
their own success.").
8 Sometimes, though, attorneys hurt their own cases because they perceive
incorrectly that either a judge or a jury would be a more sympathetic trier of
fact. Plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases win a higher percentage of bench
trials than jury trials. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by
Jury or Trial by Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124,
1136 tbl. 3 (1992). Plaintiff attorneys may seek jury trials anyway, because
they perceive that judges would be more hostile. Compounding the
misperception, plaintiff attorneys often take weak cases to a jury, because they
foresee a verdict so large that they eschew settlement. See id. at 1163.
9 Put another way, defendants in medical malpractice and other negligence suits
nowadays face the danger of a jury that makes a res ipsa loquitur inference from
any severe or visually graphic injury, even when the injury would not otherwise
meet the criteria for that kind of inference. See, e.g., Kimberly Haag, Res Ipsa
Loquitur: A Step Along the Road to Liability Without Fault, 42 BRANDEIS L.J.
158-65 (2003) (noting that expansion of the res ipsa doctrine to medical
malpractice has given plaintiffs unfair advantages if they still can call expert
witnesses, and has created a de facto strict liability posture for medical
malpractice); Aaron R. Parker, Comment, Torts-Seavers v. Methodist Medical
Center: Medical Experts May Testify to the "Fly Floating in the Buttermilk" as
Part of a Res Ipsa Loquitur Instruction in Medical Malpractice Cases, 30 U.
MEM. L. REV. 701, 715-16 (2000) (conceding, in an argument supporting the
combination of res ipsa theories and expert evidence, that "[t]here is valid
concern that this decision opens the door to make medical professionals insurers
of good results in inherently risky procedures, because jurors may be tempted to
speculate as to exactly how an injury occurred. Further, due to the fact that a
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decide subsequently to impose punitive damages, as plaintiffs'
attorneys request, in an effort to create a zero-risk environment in
the medical profession or the field of negligence law more
generally. '
0
To mitigate the prejudice that defendants can face when
plaintiffs present their injuries to juries, courts over the years have
developed a concept known as plaintiff exclusion. Plaintiff
exclusion allows defendants to keep plaintiffs out of a courtroom
during the liability phase of a trial," to allow a jury to determine
negligence without the emotional impact of graphic injuries.
Plaintiff exclusion also prevents graphic injuries from arousing
stereotypes of defendants who belong to professional vocations.'
2
For decades, plaintiff exclusion developed as a response to the
increasing complexity of modem negligence litigation.
large number of medical procedures are performed while patients are under
anesthesia or unconscious and because medical procedures are seldom
completely without risk, there is additional danger that doctors may be held
liable for circumstances completely beyond their control."); Tracy L. Rabern,
Trends in New Mexico Law: 1993-94 Note: Tort Law--Supreme Court Opens
the Door for Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice: Mireles v. Broderick,
25 N.M. L. REV. 341, 348-53 (1995) (explaining that more medical malpractice
cases will reach juries, unfairly, if plaintiffs can assemble explicit evidence of
causation without losing the ability to advance a res ipsa theory).
1o See SUNSTErN, supra note 5, at 62-73 (noting that jury awards for punitive
damages rise in proportion to what plaintiff attorneys ask juries to award); id. at
206-07 (noting that juries are more likely than judges to believe in an infinite
value of life award in an attempt to eliminate all risk).
11 None of the courts in the early plaintiff exclusion cases contemplated
bifurcating the trial into liability and damages phases. In fact, many of the early
plaintiff exclusion cases occurred before adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1939. Granting an exclusion motion in one of these early cases
would have meant keeping plaintiff out of the courtroom during the
contemplation of both liability and damages.
12 See Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury
Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J.
217, 217 (1993) ("The jury system seems to show a desire for punitive action
and retribution above and beyond the degree of injury - 'let's get the rich
doctor."').
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Specifically, courts prior to the 1960s had not seen the issue of
cognition before-that is, they had not seen plaintiffs whose severe
cognitive injuries rendered them unable to assist counsel in any
meaningful way. 13 Judges facing this new wrinkle in negligence
litigation needed a more sophisticated way to resolve the tension
between plaintiffs' desire to appear at trial, and defendants' right to
a trial free of undue prejudice. For decades, plaintiff exclusion
provided state and federal courts with a way to balance plaintiff
and defendant concerns, but this concept is in trouble now. In
recent years, several state appellate courts used broad
interpretations of their constitutions to forbid plaintiff exclusion
from taking hold.14 One state that had adopted plaintiff exclusion
recently changed its mind.' 5 Additionally, some momentum seems
to be building for a complete elimination of plaintiff exclusion in
all jurisdictions, on grounds that it discriminates against the
disabled and robs them of their day in court. The emotion behind
this momentum resembles the emotion that has fueled the victims'
rights movement in criminal cases. 16 Given plaintiff exclusion's
forced exile from Indiana, and given the constitutional and
discrimination arguments against it, the time has come to end ad
hoc analysis of the concept and to reassess its fundamental
purpose. Did plaintiff exclusion arise for a good reason, do the
arguments against it justify complete abolition, and can it still play
a useful role in twenty-first century negligence litigation?
13 For the sake of brevity during the rest of this article, the term "incapacitated
plaintiffs" shall mean plaintiffs with sufficiently severe cognitive injuries that
they do not understand that a trial is proceeding in their behalf, and that they
cannot communicate with counsel in any meaningful way, even if they do
respond generally to environmental stimuli.
14 See infra Part V.A.
15 See generally Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Deery, 778 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. 2002)
(holding that plaintiff exclusion, absent waiver or extreme circumstances,
violates plaintiffs right to attend trial).
16 See Alice Koskela, Casenote & Comment, Victim's Rights Amendments: An
Irresistible Political Force Transforms the Criminal Justice System, 34 IDAHO
L. REv. 157, 163 (1997) ("The aim of the victim's rights movement has been to
give victims a 'voice' in the process. But this understandably impassioned voice




This article will argue that plaintiff exclusion can continue
to help courts face scenarios that the history of the right to trial by
jury never could have anticipated. Part II will describe how the
earliest plaintiff exclusion motions failed because of the simple
fact patterns that early cases presented. Part II will show also how
early negligence cases, though simple in their factual patterns, laid
the foundation for modem plaintiff exclusion doctrine. Part III
will note how plaintiff exclusion motions began to succeed in the
last half-century, because courts could not adapt traditional
analysis of the right to trial by jury to the more complicated fact
patterns that they now faced. Part IV will illustrate that federal
courts eventually adopted plaintiff exclusion, once state courts had
proven its usefulness in dealing with complex fact patterns. Part V
then will explore the inadequacies of the three major arguments
against plaintiff exclusion. This article will conclude with Part VI,
which proposes a formal plaintiff exclusion test that refreshes the
concept by laying out a specific decision-making algorithm for
courts entertaining plaintiff exclusion motions, and by
incorporating safeguards against frivolous exclusion that various
jurisdictions have developed.
PART II: THE FAILURE OF THE EARLIEST PLAINTIFF EXCLUSION
MOTIONS, AND LAYING A FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE LITIGATION
Courts in early negligence cases most likely denied plaintiff
exclusion motions because of the relatively simple facts of those
cases. The early negligence cases' 7 presented plaintiffs who were
otherwise healthy people, but sustained physical injuries of varying
severity. Some of these plaintiffs sustained injuries while crossing
17 The earliest cases in which defendant filed a plaintiff exclusion motion seem
to date back to the turn of the 20th century. In fact, Sherwood v. City of Sioux
Falls, 73 N.W. 913 (S.D. 1898), may well be the first negligence case in which a
court entertained a plaintiff exclusion motion.
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railroad tracks,' 8 some while working at rock quarries,' 9 and some
while driving cars and colliding into other vehicles.2 ° In all of
these cases, plaintiffs did not suffer cognitive injuries, and retained
the full ability to participate in the subsequent negligence trial. At
least cognitively, these plaintiffs resembled the typical plaintiffs
that Seventh Amendment jurisprudence had contemplated: parties
who turn to the judiciary for a redress of grievances, and whom a
court at the turn of the twentieth century would have no reason to
exclude from their own trial.2 ' As a result, from their origins to the
middle of the twentieth century, plaintiff exclusion motions failed
routinely.
22
Although the early plaintiff exclusion cases 23 failed to show
how a plaintiff exclusion motion could succeed, they laid the
foundation for future plaintiff exclusion jurisprudence by
modifying analysis of the Seventh Amendment. 24  The plaintiff
exclusion cases that began the re-examination of the Seventh
Amendment drew from an earlier case that concerned fraud, not
18 See Chicago Great W. Ry. Co. v. Beecher, 150 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1945).
19 See Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76 (1919).
20 See, e.g., Fla. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1952).
21 See, e.g., Beecher, 150 F.2d at 399 ("At the commencement of the trial
counsel for the defendant requested the court to exclude the infant plaintiff from
the court room during the trial. The request was denied, the court saying, 'I
know of no rule of law which authorizes the court to exclude plaintiff,
defendant, or any litigant from the court room'; and no authority was cited to the
court in support of the request. Neither is any authority cited in the brief in this
court to support defendant's contention, and we have found none. We conclude
that the contention is without merit.").
22 A LEXIS-NEXIS and Westlaw search of cases involving plaintiff exclusion or
the right to trial by jury shows that no court before the 1960s granted a plaintiff
exclusion motion.
23 I will use the term "plaintiff exclusion case" as shorthand for any negligence
case in which defendant moves to exclude plaintiff from the courtroom for at
least some part of the trial, out of concern that plaintiffs presence alone will
4rejudice the jury.
4 "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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negligence. In Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., Ltd.,2' a
British cattle ranching company sued an Iowa rancher for
misrepresenting the number of heads in a cattle sale. After trial,
the jury retired for deliberations, but then returned to court to ask
the judge a question.27 Neither the parties nor their counsel were
present when the jury asked its question or when the judge
answered it. The jury subsequently retired again and reached a
verdict for plaintiff. Defendant appealed the verdict, arguing
essentially28 a Seventh Amendment argument: that the court ought
not to have communicated with the jury without giving counsel for
each side a chance to object to the communication. 29 The Court
affirmed the verdict, holding in part that a judge may communicate
with a jury as long as the communication occurs in open court.30
Counselors for each side, according to the Court, bear
responsibility for attending proceedings whenever the court is in
session.31  The holding in Stewart laid the foundation for the
discussion of Seventh Amendment rights in plaintiff exclusion
cases because it implied that a court under the right circumstances
could proceed to a fair verdict without the literal physical presence
of the parties.
Admittedly, Stewart implied only subtly that the Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury and a right to attend trial were
25 128 U.S. 383 (1888).
26 See id. at 383-84.
27 Id. at 390.
28 The text of the Stewart decision does not mention the Seventh Amendment
explicitly.
29 See Stewart, 128 U.S. at 390.
30 See id.; see also Ry. Express Agency v. Little, 50 F.2d 59, 63 (3d Cir. 1931)
(holding that a trial judge instructed a jury properly, where the instructions
occurred in open court and where counsel waived the right to receive notice
before the jury returned to open court).
31 See Stewart, 128 U.S. at 390 ("The absence of counsel, while the court is in
session, at any time between the impaneling of the jury and the return of the
verdict, cannot limit the power and duty of the judge to instruct the jury in open
court on the law of the case as occasion may require ... ").
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two different principles. Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co. 32 made
this distinction much more explicit-so explicit, in fact, that this
case arguably made the concept of plaintiff exclusion possible. In
Fillippon, a worker at a rock quarry sued the quarry for negligence.
Plaintiff's work crew blasted out a large block of rock, and needed
to place chains around it for attachment to a hoisting tackle.33
Standard procedure for a rock of that size called for using sticks to
place wedges further under the rock than a worker could place
safely by hand.34 Plaintiff asked for a stick to place a wedge the
proper distance under the rock, but the foreman on site insisted that
plaintiff go ahead and do it by hand.35 While plaintiff complied
with the foreman's wishes, the rock fell from its perch and crushed
36plaintiff's arm. The injuries to plaintiffs arm warranted
amputation.
37
At the conclusion of the trial in plaintiff's negligence suit,
the jury received instructions from the judge and retired for
38deliberations. During deliberations, the jury sent the judge a
written inquiry about whether plaintiff committed contributory
negligence. With regard to plaintiff exclusion history, what the
judge wrote in response 39 does not matter as much as how the
response reached the jury--"in the absence of the parties and their
32 250 U.S. 76 (1919).
33 Id. at 78. A tackle is "[a] system of ropes and blocks for raising and lowering
weights of rigging and pulleys for applying tension." AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/61/91/T0009100.html (last visited May 24, 2005).34 Fillippon, 250 U.S. at 78.
35 Id.
36 Id.
371 Id. at 78-79.
38 Id. at 80.39 The judge responded that:
[i]f he was told to put it under as stated by the plaintiff and he did
so, fully appreciating at the time the danger attending and having
sufficient time to consider, when he was face to face with a
situation that would have made a reasonably prudent man to
disobey the orders of the foreman, notwithstanding, and he went
ahead in spite of the dangers known to him and apparent, he is
guilty of contributory negligence. Id.
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counsel, without their consent, and without calling the jury in open
court. ' 4 ° This private communication 4' with the jury differed from
the open communication that occurred in Stewart, and it led the
Fillippon Court to reverse the verdict for defendant and remand.42
The Court ruled that the whole point of objecting to a jury
instruction was to change the judge's mind on an erroneous legal
interpretation, before that error hurts either side in a trial.43
Reversing a judge's instruction after the fact would not necessarily
correct a legal error, because the error could prejudice the jury and
force a mistrial.44 Ultimately, the Court ruled that jury instructions
must occur in open court and with notice to counsel, because
[T]he orderly conduct of a trial by jury, essential to the
proper protection of the right to be heard, entitles the
parties who attend for the purpose to be present in
person or by counsel at all proceedings from the time
the jury is impaneled until it is discharged after
rendering the verdict.
45
Although no one could have known at the time, the most
important part of the Fillippon decision, as it pertains to plaintiff
exclusion, comprised three words that had not appeared in Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence before. With those three words, the
40 id.
41 Ex parte communication is "A communication between counsel and the court
when opposing counsel is not present. Such communications are ordinarily
prohibited." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 296 (8th ed. 2004).
42 Fillippon, 250 U.S. at 84.
41 See id. at 82.
44 See id.
45 Id. at 81. Incidentally, the rule requiring open jury instructions does not
constrain a court to the point that a party could avoid an adverse jury instruction
by refusing to come to court. A judge may communicate with the jury without a
party's presence, as long as the party knows in advance that such
communication will occur. See, e.g., Cook v. Green, 6 N.J.L. 109, 109 (N.J.
1822).
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Fillippon Court crystallized the distinction between the Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury and the right to attend trial. The
Court wrote that a proper trial required parties "to be present in
person or by counsel.',4 6  In writing those three words, the
Fillippon Court distanced itself from any assumption that a party to
suit had to be present at trial under all circumstances.47
Although courts continue to cite to Fillippon to this day,
48
the case and its impact on plaintiff exclusion remained dormant for
decades. Through the 1950s, state and federal jurisdictions
continued to assume that plaintiffs in personal injury trials had to
be allowed to attend trial, if they wished. In Chicago Great
Western Railway Co. v. Beecher,49 for example, a freight train
struck a three-year old child on a rail line crossed often by children
46 Fillippon, 250 U.S. at 81 (emphasis added). Even when counsel appears in
court alone, on plaintiffs behalf, a plaintiff with sufficient cognition to direct
the main strategy of a case will be allowed to do so. See Jones v. Barnes, 463
U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (holding that an indigent criminal defendant has the right
to make certain fundamental decisions in the case, but no right to direct
appointed counsel to raise every possible nonfrivolous point, if counsel decides
as a matter of professional judgment not to do so).
47 What matters fundamentally is that each side make as full a case as it wants to
make. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) ("The paramount importance
of vigorous representation follows from the nature of our adversarial system of
justice. This system is premised on the well-tested principle that truth-as well
as fairness-is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the
question.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Suppose, though, that a court issues an exclusion motion. As an
unorthodox method of remaining available to consult with an attorney during the
trial, can a plaintiff attend trial as a member of the public? Compare Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980) (holding that the
public has the right to attend trials) with Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, 730
A.2d 221, 238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (holding that the public's right to
attend trials is not absolute and does not overcome concerns about jury
prejudice), aff'd, 785 A.2d 361 (Md. Ct. App. 2001).
48 See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119 (1983) (citing Fillippon when holding
that a prisoner did not need habeas corpus relief, where a juror had two ex parte
communications with the trial judge); 2-20 MOORE'S MANUAL-FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 20.05 (2004) (citing Stewart and Fillippon and
noting that jury instructions not given in open court are not valid unless counsel
waive explicitly the right to be present).
49 150 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1945).
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and adults.5 ° The court denied a motion by defendant to exclude
the child from the courtroom out of concern for jury prejudice,
holding that it did not know of any law that authorized it to
exclude any litigant from the courtroom.5' The court noted
additionally that defendant cited no authority that would justify
exclusion of plaintiff.52  Other cases used similar reasoning,
holding that plaintiffs in personal injury trials had the right to
attend simply because they were parties to the suit at bar.
53
PART III: THE EMERGENCE OF COGNITION AS AN ISSUE, AND
TIE TWO FOUNDING CASES OF MODERN PLAINTIFF EXCLUSION
Beginning in the 1960s, courts hearing plaintiff exclusion
cases began to face a new, more complex fact pattern. Plaintiff
exclusion cases at this time began54 to feature plaintiffs who
'0 See id. at 396-97.
"' See id. at 399.
52 Id.
53 See Fla. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1952);
Bryant v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 228 S.W. 472, 475 (Mo. 1921) (en banc),
overruled in part on other grounds by Talbert v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
Ry. Co., 15 S.W.2d 762 (Mo. 1929); E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Van Orman, 179 N.E.
147, 149 (Ohio Ct. App. 1931); Sanders v. Lowrimore, 73 S.W.2d 148, 150
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934); cf In re Rogers' Estate, 283 N.W. 906, 907 (Iowa 1939)
(holding that the trial court should have granted plaintiff a continuance, where
plaintiff had a severe throat infection and received advice not to attend trial for a
few days); Leonard's of Plainfield, Inc. v. Dybas, 31 A.2d 496, 497 (N.J. 1943)
(holding that the right to attend trial covered all phases except jury deliberations,
and that the trial court thus should have issued a jury instruction in the parties'
absence); Miller v. Grier S. Johnson, Inc., 62 S.E.2d 870, 874 (Va. 1951) (ruling
that defendant exclusion was proper where defendant had not proven his illness
to the court's satisfaction, thus preventing defendant from invoking the right to
attend to justify a continuance motion).
54 Why didn't cognition and other complex personal injury issues arise before
the 1960s? This article will speculate very briefly here that two factors may
answer that question. One possible factor is the state of medical technology in
the early twentieth century. None of the early plaintiff exclusion cases feature
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suffered severe cognitive injuries, as well as physical injuries.
These plaintiffs' cognitive injuries left them unable to
communicate with counsel, and unable to follow trial
proceedings. 55  The inability of incapacitated plaintiffs to
contribute at all to their trials suddenly revivified Fillippon: if
attorneys under some circumstances could substitute at trial for
plaintiffs capable of contributing to their own cases, then they
should be able to substitute for plaintiffs when they are on their
own because of their clients' incapacitation.
The emergence of cognition as a major factor in deciding
plaintiff exclusion motions separates the early plaintiff exclusion
claims relating to birth defects, perhaps because infants born at that time would
not have survived the conditions that plaintiffs bore in a case like Jordan.
Another possible factor is society's increased expectations from modem
medicine. Medical practitioners have noticed that advanced technology and
increased health consciousness have made the concept of uncontrollable, chronic
illness increasingly unacceptable. See, e.g., Nancy Pariser, Springtime for
Obstetrics and Gynecology: Will the Specialty Continue to Blossom?, Letter to
the Editor, 103 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 197 (2004) (noting that obstetric
residents are guaranteed to face litigation during their careers, despite their
training, because modem obstetricians "are held to the impossible standard of
delivering the perfect baby. Anything short of the perfect baby with our current
system is guaranteed malpractice litigation."); Edward L. Van Oeveren, The
Past and Future of Medical Malpractice Litigation, Letter to the Editor, 284
JAMA 827-29 (2000) (noting that medical malpractice litigation began in the
mid-19th century, "following a period of increased religiosity, greater popular
attention to physical fitness and health, and food reforms-all phenomena with
contemporary analogues"); Charles Vincent, Magi Young, & Angela Phillips,
Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal
Action, 343 THE LANCET 1609-13 (1994) (noting, in a study of British
malpractice litigation, that patients are more likely to sue when treated poorly
and sue for reasons other than monetary compensation-to ensure that no one
else will suffer the same way; to force a previously reticent health provider to
explain exactly what happened; and to force someone in the medical community
to take responsibility for the injuries).
55 When plaintiff can follow trial proceedings, counsel can benefit from a
number of roles that plaintiff can play. See Allen P. Grunes, Exclusion of
Plaintiffs from the Courtroom in Personal Injury Actions: A Matter of
Discretion or Constitutional Right?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 387, 396-97
(1988) (outlining the educative, strategic, moral, evidentiary, proprietary, and
public roles that plaintiff can play at trial).
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cases from the modem era56 of plaintiff exclusion. In this context,
Dickson v. Bober5 7 was the first5 8 plaintiff exclusion case of the
modem era. In Dickson, defendant's automobile collided with
plaintiff's motorcycle, leaving plaintiff with severe injuries that
required an extensive hospital stay.5 9 Since plaintiff was a minor
at the time of the accident, his father brought suit on his behalf,
and alleged negligence by the automobile driver.60  Plaintiff's
father would have had to commence the suit anyway, because the
accident left plaintiff unable to make his own claims and unable to
comprehend the trial. 61 Defendant moved to exclude plaintiff from
the courtroom during trial, out of concern for unfair jury
prejudice. 62 Defendant ultimately won the motion, and won the
verdict, but an appellate court ordered a new trial based on
plaintiffs absence from the first trial.63  The Dickson court, in
56 1 will define the start of the "modem era" loosely as the mid-1960s, because
cases around this time began to account for plaintiffs' cognition, and plaintiff
exclusion at this time began to resemble closely the modem plaintiff exclusion
doctrine that exists today.
51 130 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1964).
58 Supporting Dickson's status as the first modem plaintiff exclusion case is the
complete absence, in the Dickson opinion, of citation to any earlier authority that
separated cognitive from physical injuries.
59 See Dickson, 130 N.W.2d at 529.
60 See id.
61 "The accident changed Allan Dickson from a vital, intelligent, healthy youth
to one unable to express or sustain himself, helpless and entirely dependent on
others, and wholly unable to comprehend trial proceedings." Id., 130 N.W.2d at
529.
62 Before the trial began, the trial judge observed plaintiff for himself and noted
that
[h]is eyes seemed to function on detection of an unusual movement.
Hideous and agonizing groans and sounds emanated from plaintiff. In
this trial test, arranged so that the court would have some conception of
what was involved, the above is a fair description of the depressing
spectacle that in all likelihood could have been enacted if plaintiff's
request [to present Allan to the jury] had been granted. Id.
63 See id.
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reversing the appellate court finding and remanding to restore the
original verdict, noted that plaintiff had adequate legal
representation. 64  Additionally, the court noted that plaintiffs
absence could not have hurt his case, because "[t]he jury in this
case determined that the accident was caused by negligence on the
part of both drivers. It did not reach the question of damages. 65
Plaintiff's absence might have hurt him had the jury proceeded to a
determination of damages.66 In the damages phase, the Dickson
jury would have had to look at plaintiff and his injuries to
determine the severity of the disability sustained and the
appropriate size of the award. Finally, the Dickson court examined
a number of the early plaintiff exclusion cases. 67  The Dickson
64 Dickson, 130 N.W.2d at 530.
65 id.
66 The jury did not proceed to a determination of damages because Minnesota
was a contributory negligence state at the time. See id. at 529. The Dickson
jury may have proceeded to a damages phase under current Minnesota law,
which follows a comparative negligence standard and allows for reduced awards
as long as the award recipient is less than 50% liable. See MINN. STAT.
§ 604.01(1) (2004).
67 See, e.g., Chicago Great W. Ry. Co. v. Beecher, 150 F.2d 394, 399 (8th Cir.
1945) (ruling against plaintiff exclusion, where plaintiff suffered "personal
injuries" with no mention of impact on cognition); Fla. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Jones, 60 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1952) (ruling against plaintiff exclusion, based
on physical injuries alone); Bryant v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 228 S.W. 472, 475
(Mo. 1921) (en banc) (ruling against plaintiff exclusion where plaintiff lost a
leg), overruled in part on other grounds, Talbert v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
Ry. Co., 15 S.W.2d 762 (Mo. 1929); E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Van Orman, 179 N.E.
147, 149 (Ohio Ct. App. 1931) (ruling against plaintiff exclusion where
plaintiff's physical injuries left her unable to testify); Sanders v. Lowrimore, 73
S.W.2d 148, 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (ruling against plaintiff exclusion where
plaintiff suffered physical injuries in a car accident); cf In re Rogers' Estate,
283 N.W. 906, 907 (Iowa 1939) (holding that the trial court should have granted
plaintiff a continuance, where plaintiff had a severe throat infection and received
advice not to attend trial for a few days); Leonard's of Plainfield, Inc. v. Dybas,
31 A.2d 496, 497 (N.J. 1943) (holding that the right to attend trial covered all
phases except jury deliberations, and that the trial court thus should have issued
a jury instruction in the parties' absence); Miller v. Grier S. Johnson, Inc., 62
S.E.2d 870, 874 (Va. 1951) (ruling that defendant exclusion was proper where
defendant had not proven his illness to the court's satisfaction, thus preventing
defendant from invoking the right to attend to justify a continuance motion).
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court distinguished the facts of its case by noting that the cases that
gave plaintiffs a right to attend trial concerned plaintiffs with
strictly physical injuries, and no mental impairment. 8
The reasoning from Dickson influenced Morley v. Superior
Court,69 which also attempted to balance plaintiff and defendant
rights at trial and also became an influential plaintiff exclusion
case. In Morley, an automobile accident left one plaintiff comatose
and another with retrograde amnesia. 70  Defendant successfully
bifurcated the trial, and the trial court, inter alia, granted a motion
to exclude the comatose 7 1 plaintiff from the courtroom during both
phases of the trial.72 In reviewing the trial court's decisions, the
Morley court considered the state of plaintiff exclusion in other
jurisdictions.73 Ultimately, the court decided to follow the ruling
from Dickson, with its discussion of cognition as a separate issue
68 See Dickson, 130 N.W.2d at 530.
69 638 P.2d 1331 (Ariz. 1981).
70 1d. at 1332.
71 The Morley court described plaintiff Morley as living in a vegetative state.
"This vegetative state, which will probably last the remainder of his life,
requires a tracheostomy for him to breathe, and he is fed from a tube inserted in
his stomach." Id.
72 Id.
73 The Morley court cites to two other plaintiff exclusion cases that came after
Dickson but before its own case. Technically, these cases are part of the
modem era of plaintiff exclusion, as defined in note 56 supra. These cases,
though, lack the precedential value of Dickson and Morley either because they
ruled on narrow factual matters, or ruled only tangentially on the legal matters
that affect plaintiff exclusion. For example, in Talcott v. Holl, 224 So. 2d 420
(Fla. Ct. App. 1969), two doctors appealed a judgment against them in part
because the trial court allowed plaintiff's attorney to bring her into the
courtroom on a stretcher for use as demonstrative evidence. Id. at 421. The
appellate court upheld the verdict as to this issue, because plaintiff remained in
the courtroom for only a few minutes. Id. at 422. In Freeman v. Rubin, 318 So.
2d 540 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975), a case concerning legal practice and not personal
injury, the court noted at the end of its opinion, almost parenthetically, that
plaintiff had been excluded from the courtroom and shouldn't have been, "in the
absence of a showing that he was so incapacitated that he could not comprehend
the trial proceedings .... ." Id. at 544.
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from physical injuries. As in Dickson, the court noted that the
comatose plaintiff could not speak, and that he had adequate legal
representation for the upcoming trial.74 In allowing defendant to
exclude plaintiff from the liability phase of trial, the Morley court
rejected what it termed the "negative reasoning" 75  that
characterized the earliest attempts at arguments for a constitutional
right to attend trial.76
In adhering to Dickson, the Morley court also reversed the
lower court on the exclusion of the comatose plaintiff during the
damages phase of the trial.77 The court recognized that once a
jury finds defendant liable, the most direct evidence of injury that
it can view is plaintiff's own physical condition.78 During the
damages phase of trial,
[D]efendant cannot avoid responsibility for his or her
conduct by preventing the jury from seeing the results
of that conduct and applying community standards to
74 "A plaintiff unable to at least communicate with counsel will have no right
denied by exclusion from the courtroom during the liability phase of the trial."
Morley, 638 P.2d at 1334.
75 As examples of negative reasoning, the Morley court cited Chicago Great W.
Ry. Co. v. Beecher, 150 F.2d 394, 399 (8th Cir. 1945) ("The request [for
plaintiff exclusion] was denied, the court saying, 'I know of no rule of law
which authorizes the court to exclude plaintiff, defendant, or any litigant from
the court room'; and no authority was cited to the court in support of the request.
Neither is any authority cited in the brief in this court to support defendant's
contention, and we have found none. We conclude that the contention is without
merit."), and Bryant v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 228 S.W. 472, 475 (Mo. 1921)
("We know of no court which ever excluded the parties to an action from the
presence of the jury, and the authorities cited by appellant do not go so far. If
they did, we would not follow them. Certain it is that no Missouri court has so
ruled. This complaint of defendant is without merit."), overruled in part on
other grounds, Talbert v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 15 S.W.2d 762
(Mo. 1929).
76 Morley, 638 P.2d at 1333 (noting that "[t]he oldest cases simply applied
negative reasoning-there is no authority to exclude a litigant from the
courtroom, so the litigants have a right to be present").
77 See id. at 1334 ("Paul Morley should be permitted to appear before the jury to




those results. A jury should not decide liability based
on the severity of the plaintiff's injury, but certainly
the jury should award damages based on the severity
of the plaintiffs injuries.79
Together, these two state cases opened a new dimension to
plaintiff exclusion jurisprudence. By allowing courts to judge an
exclusion motion based on the cognitive or physical nature of
plaintiff's injuries, Dickson and Morley gave future courts a way to
account for more factors when deciding an exclusion motion in
negligence litigation.
PART IV: PLAINTIFF EXCLUSION ENTERS THE FEDERAL COURTS
Plaintiff exclusion might have remained an obscure state-
level legal theory, but for an important development a few years
after Morley: the complex fact patterns that reached the Dickson
and Morley courts began to arrive at federal benches. From the
issuance of Dickson in 1964 to the issuance of Morley in 1981, the
modem era of plaintiff exclusion affected only state courts.
Modem plaintiff exclusion reached maturity, when it gained some
structure and a federal audience in Helminski v. Ayerst
Laboratories.80  In Helminski, plaintiff alleged 81 that his autism
resulted from his in utero exposure to Fluothane, a general
anesthetic that his mother used routinely in her job as a nurse
anesthetist.83 Because of the alleged Fluothane exposure, plaintiff
79 Id,
80 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981 (1985).
81 Officially, plaintiffs parents sued on plaintiff's behalf, as his next friends.
Helminski, 766 F.2d at 213.
82 "Fluothane is the trade or brand name of halothane, a general anesthetic,
which is a central nervous system depressant. Ayerst received permission from
the Food and Drug Administration to market Fluothane as a surgical anesthetic
in 1958." Id. at 210 n.l.
83 Id. at 210.
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developed severe mental retardation. 84  Defendants moved
successfully to bifurcate the trial, and then moved successfully to
exclude plaintiff from the courtroom during the liability phase of
the trial. Plaintiff challenged the bifurcation, the exclusion, and
the verdict of no cause of action, arguing that they infringed on his
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and his Fifth Amendment
right to due process of law.
86
The Helminski court upheld the trial court's rulings for
three reasons. First, the Helminski court ruled that trial courts may
bifurcate a personal injury trial into liability and damages phases
when "'the evidence pertinent to the two issues is wholly
unrelated' and the evidence relevant to the damages issue could
have a prejudicial impact upon the jury's liability determination." 87
Second, the Helminski court decided that "[n]either the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause nor the Seventh Amendment's
guarantee of a jury trial grants to a civil litigant the absolute right
to be present personally during the trial of his case., 88  The
Helminski court concluded that the exclusion of plaintiff did not
violate his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
89
84 See id. ("Eventually, physicians determined that Hugh was autistic. As a result
of this condition, Hugh requires 24-hour a day care; he does not speak, is not
toilet trained, and has an extremely low IQ. Hugh's arrested neurological
development is permanent and irreversible.").
" Id. at 211.
86 id.
87 Id. at 212; see also 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2390 (2004).
88 Helminski, 766 F.2d at 213 (citing Faucher v. Lopez, 411 F.2d 992, 996 (9th
Cir. 1969)).
89 Id. at 218-19 (finding no reversible error in the trial court's conduct). Some
writers have questioned whether the Sixth Circuit should have made plaintiff
exclusion a constitutional issue, as opposed to leaving it a procedural issue
within the trial court's discretion. See Grunes, supra note 55, at 405-06. Courts
in earlier times may not have needed to sort out the constitutional implications
of plaintiff exclusion, but they will have to do so now if courts keep concluding,
without historical evidence, that they cannot separate the right to a jury trial and
the right to attend that trial. See infra Part IV.A for more discussion of this
topic, but for now, if courts decide that the right to a jury trial and the right to
attend that trial are one and the same, then they cannot avoid a re-examination of
prior due process jurisprudence. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523
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A. Criteria for excluding plaintiffs: the "Helminski
test"
When the Helminski court considered what to do with the
facts before it, the court examined existing plaintiff exclusion case
law, and grouped the cases into two categories.90 One category
comprised cases stating generally that plaintiffs had a right, in
person or by counsel, to attend all phases of a trial. 9' In cases in
this category, allowing counsel to substitute for plaintiffs in some
circumstances did not mean that courts could exclude plaintiffs
arbitrarily under any circumstances. 92 A second category of cases
corresponds with "pre-modem" 93 plaintiff exclusion cases:94 cases
(2004) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
"requires the States to afford certain civil litigants a 'meaningful opportunity to
be heard' by removing obstacles to their full participation in judicial
proceedings") (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). In fact,
the time may come when the vegetative plaintiff, who represents a once-
unthinkable splitting of the rights to pursue a trial and literally to speak at it,
forces explicit holdings that the right to trial by jury, as expressed in the Seventh
Amendment and the state constitutions, is only the means to the end envisioned
by the right to due process, and bows to the due process right when the two
conflict and the jury trial right fails to give defendants a hearing free of
unneeded prejudice.
90 Helminski, 766 F.2d at 214.
91 See id. The cases that the Helminski court placed into this category are
Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76, 81 (1919); McKnelly v. Sperry
Corp., 642 F.2d 1101, 1108 (8th Cir. 1981); Arrington v. Robertson, 114 F.2d
821, 823 (3d Cir. 1940); and Florence v. Moors Concrete Prods., Inc., 193
N.W.2d 72, 75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
92 Helminski, 766 F.2d at 214.
93 See supra note 56 (defining the "modem era" of plaintiff exclusion).
94 For this category, the Helminski court cited Carlisle v. County of Nassau, 408
N.Y.S.2d 114 (App. Div. 1978); Purvis v. Inter-County Tel. & Tel. Co., 203 So.
2d 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (per curiam); and Fla. Greyhound Lines, Inc.
v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1952).
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that deny exclusion motions, where plaintiffs happened95 to have
only physical injuries. The Helminski court distinguished its case
from these two categories, and then set forth how trial courts could
exclude plaintiffs without offending their Fifth Amendment 96 due
process rights. Later cases eventually would refer to these
guidelines as the "Helminski test."
The Helminski test is not so much a "test" or decision-
making algorithm as it is a set of three guidelines. First, trial
courts cannot exclude plaintiffs simply for having an injury,
because "the focus of the inquiry should not be on the plaintiffs
physical and mental condition; rather, the critical inquiry concerns
the effect of such condition on the jury."97  Second, when
defendants want to exclude plaintiffs, they should do so through a
formal motion,98 which then requires a hearing.99  Third, at a
hearing on an exclusion motion, defendants bear the burden of
persuasion. Defendants must prove not just that plaintiffs have a
disability, or that plaintiffs have a cognitive disability that will
prevent them from comprehending the trial, 00 but that plaintiffs'
particular condition will prejudice the jury. 101 The prejudice must
prevent or substantially impair the jury from performing its fact-
95 Of the three cases that the Helminski court placed into this category, only one
contemplated what it might have done with a cognition-impaired plaintiff. See
Purvis, 203 So. 2d at 510-11 (examining Dickson and then distinguishing it).
96 Or Fourteenth Amendment, in the case of a state court.
9' Helminski, 766 F.2d at 217.
98 Under the Helminski test, the motion "in most cases" could come before trial,
which leaves defendant the option to move for exclusion in the middle of a trial,
as it deems necessary. See Helminski, 766 F.2d at 217.
99 See id. at 217. Besides giving each side a chance to make its arguments, the
hearing will allow the court to view plaintiff for itself, and to form its own
opinion of plaintiff's condition. See id.
1 00 "The requisite showing of prejudice cannot be satisfied simply by
establishing that a plaintiff has a physical or mental injury; the party seeking
exclusion must establish that the party's appearance or conduct is likely to
prevent the jury from performing its duty." Id. at 218.
"We reiterate that a party's ability to comprehend the proceedings or assist
counsel is not the relevant inquiry at this juncture-the issue is whether the
party's presence will unfairly prejudice the proceedings in his favor." Id. at 218.
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finding duties in accordance with the court's instructions.' 02
Giving defendants the burden of persuasion, the Helminski
court reasoned, would prevent reflexive motion practice that
targets plaintiffs' disabled status, and assumes that juries never can
be objective. 10 3 If defendants follow all of the guidelines of the
Helminski test, then a judge may bifurcate the trial and exclude
plaintiffs from the liability phase. 104 Exclusion would not apply to
the damages phase of trials, when juries would need to examine the
extent of plaintiffs' injuries to decide the size of injury awards.'0 5
The Helminski test thus accomplished an important feat besides
bringing plaintiff exclusion into a federal jurisdiction for the first
time. The Helminski test also provided guidance to other
jurisdictions that had to adjudicate, for the first time, negligence
cases involving incapacitated plaintiffs.
102 Helminski, 766 F.2d at 217-18.
103 See id. at 217 ("To allow involuntary exclusion on any other basis [i.e., other
than by giving defendant the burden of persuasion] would permit the
presumption that an injured person's presence alone will always deter the jury
from its factfinding mission. Such a presumption would only institutionalize a
reaction based solely upon appearance. This we decline to do.").
104 In an interesting sidenote to the case, the Helminski court ruled that the trial
court excluded plaintiff improperly, under the Helminski test, because the
exclusion occurred based on plaintiff's appearance alone. See id. at 218.
Nonetheless, the Helminski court found no reversible error because:
[W]here the Helminskis acted as Hugh's next friends
and legal representatives, where all parties agree that
Hugh was completely unable to comprehend the
proceedings, and where Hugh because of his
extremely low IQ could not aid his attorney in any
meaningfil way, we conclude that Hugh's exclusion
does not constitute reversible error.
Id.
'o' See id. at 217 ("Exclusion of a party from the damages portion of the
proceedings is, however, inappropriate.").
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B. Cases that followed Helminski
Other federal courts subsequently relied on Helminski,
concluding that it balanced plaintiff and defendant concerns
regarding a fair trial.' 0 6 Citation to Helminski also occurs in that
federal-state hybrid, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.'
0 7
Among the federal circuits, the First Circuit adopted the Helminski
test and has faulted trial courts for not following its guidelines.'
0 8
The Sixth Circuit has affirmed Helminski and extended it to voir
dire proceedings. 10 9 The Eighth Circuit cited Helminski and its
treatment of bifurcation when handling a consolidated action
related to dioxin exposure." 0 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
cited to Helminski and its protection of plaintiffs with only
physical injuries.'l1
The Helminski test influenced state jurisdictions as well."12
106 A LEXIS-NEXIS Shepard's report on Helminski shows that, as of May 24,
2005, the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits
have issued no decisions that adopted the Helminski test. In some of these
circuits, a few district courts have cited Helminski. See McEachron v. Glans,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21926 (N.D.N.Y Aug. 23, 1999) (Second Circuit);
Adkins v. Serv. Wire Co., No. 3:02-0982, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21089
(S.D.W. Va. Oct. 31, 2002) (Fourth Circuit); Pittman v. Nabors Offshore Corp.,
No. 00-2051, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5419 (E.D. La. 2001) (Fifth Circuit); In re
Del Rio, No. 401CV65, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24971, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 15,
2001) (Eleventh Circuit). No trial or appellate court in the Third, D.C., or
Federal Circuits ever has cited Helminski.107 See Levi v. District of Columbia, 697 A.2d 1201, 1206 (D.C. 1997).
108 See Rubert-Torres ex rel. Cintron-Rupert v. Hosp. San Pablo, Inc., 205 F.3d
472, 478 (1st Cir. 2000).
'09 See Preferred Props. v. Indian River Estates, 2002 FED App. 0006P, 276
F.3d 790, 797-98 (6th Cir.).
110 See O'Dell v. Hercules, Inc., 904 F.2d 1194, 1202 (8th Cir. 1990).
111 See Kulas v. Flores, 255 F.3d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 2001); Thompson v.
Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020, 1032 (10th Cir. 2001).
112 See Province v. Ctr. for Women's Health & Family Birth, 25 Cal. Rptr 2d
667, 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); In re Doe Children, 76 P.3d 578, 585 (Haw. Ct.
App. 2003); Gage v. Bozarth, 505 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), overruled
by Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Deery, 778 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. 2002), reh'g denied,
No. 75S05-0106-CV-310, 2003 Ind. LEXIS 287 (Mar. 26, 2003); Reems v. St.
Joseph's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 536 N.W.2d 666, 669 (N.D. 1995); Caputo v.
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In Green v. North Arundel Hospital Association, Inc.," 3 for
example, Maryland adopted the Helminski test for the first time
because it allowed trial judges to examine plaintiffs situation
before granting defendant's exclusion motion. 1 4  Plaintiff in
Green brought an action"15 against an array of health care
providers for failing to diagnose a failed hydrocephalic shunt." 6
The failed shunt increased plaintiffs hydroencephalic pressure,
leaving him in a permanent vegetative state." 7 Defendant moved
to bifurcate the trial and exclude plaintiff from the liability phase,
out of concern that "his presence served no purpose other than to
prejudice the jurors against the defendants."" 8  In affirming the
trial court's exclusion of plaintiff, the Green court quoted
extensively from the trial court's decision that "any viewing of the
[p]laintiff in person or by video would leave any party in a position
Joseph J. Sarcona Trucking Co., 204 A.D.2d 507, 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); In
re Burkhart, No. CA90-07-146, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 3937 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 19, 1991); Bremner v. Charles, 821 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Ore. 1991); Burks v.
Harris, No. 02A01-9110-CV-00253, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 913 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Nov. 10, 1992).
730 A.2d 221 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999), af'd, 785 A.2d 361 (Md. Ct. App.
2001).
114 See id. at 236 (noting that with the help of the Helminski test, the trial judge
"went to great lengths to ensure that [plaintiff]'s constitutional rights were not
violated by arbitrarily excluding him from trial").
115 As with other cases, plaintiff was a minor child; officially, his parents sued
on his behalf, as his next friends.
116 See John P. Laurent, M.D., Hydrocephalus / Shunts, at
http://www.bcm.tmc.edu/pednsurg/disorder/hydro.htm (last modified June 18,
1997) ("The standard treatment for hydrocephalus is surgery. The surgical
procedure usually involves diverting CSF [cerebrospinal fluid] through a
surgically implanted shunt. This shunt is a detour or bypass procedure that is
made by placing a catheter in the ventricles in the interior of the brain. The fluid
drainage is accomplished with a pressure-controlled valve, and usually the fluid
is drained outside the brain into the abdominal cavity where it is reabsorbed
along the belly wall.").
1"7 See Green, 730 A.2d at 226.
..
8 Id. at 224.
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to be emotionally struck and otherwise feeling sympathy for the
[p]laintiff."'19
The diversity of jurisdictions that have adopted Helminski
independently suggests that the courts in question have not
schemed to attack incapacitated plaintiffs for characteristics that
those plaintiffs cannot control. Rather, plaintiff exclusion spread
through state and federal jurisdictions because modem negligence
cases have outgrown the traditional parameters of Seventh
Amendment analysis. Courts that have dealt with incapacitated
plaintiffs recognize that risking jury prejudice for responsive
plaintiffs serves the higher purpose of enforcing the Seventh
Amendment, whereas risking jury prejudice for incapacitated
plaintiffs serves no such purpose. In that context, courts have
developed plaintiff exclusion out of necessity, not out of whim or
animus.
PART V: THE STATES RESPOND TO HELMINSKI: THREE
ARGUMENTS AGAINST PLAINTIFF EXCLUSION AND WHY THEY
FALL SHORT
Although the number of federal jurisdictions embracing
Helminski has increased steadily, and although some states also
have adopted the Helminski test, plaintiff exclusion appears to have
entered a twilight phase. One state that had adopted the Helminski
test later rejected it.12  Other states chose not to follow
Helminski;121 most others have yet to take up the matter in their
courts. The states that forbid plaintiff exclusion have considered
several different reasons for doing so. A close examination of
these arguments shows that they ignore modem courts' need to
deal with the increasing medical complexity of negligence cases.
The arguments against plaintiff exclusion, discussed below,
confuse responsive for incapacitated plaintiffs and thus do not
address the fact patterns that face modem courts in plaintiff
exclusion cases.
119 Id. at 236 (alteration in original).
120 See Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Deery, 778 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. 2002).
121 See generally infra Part V.A.
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A. Constitutional arguments: the right to trial by jury
According to one of the arguments against plaintiff
exclusion, keeping plaintiffs out of the courtroom during any part
of their own trial violates their Seventh Amendment constitutional
right to trial by jury. Allegations of a Seventh Amendment
violation assume a pre-Fillippon posture, asserting in essence that
the right to trial by jury and the right to attend that trial are so
interwoven as to be plectonemic. Consequently, according to the
argument, curtailing the right to trial by jury always harms
plaintiff's right to trial by jury.
New York embraced this argument as early as 1978 in
Carlisle v. County of Nassau.122  In Carlisle, a detective shot
plaintiff during an altercation, leaving plaintiff a paraplegic.'
23
Defendants tried to exclude plaintiff from jury selection
proceedings, citing concern for improper influence on jury
selection. 124 Plaintiff won the right to remain, because the court
declared that his right to attend jury selection proceedings
constituted a corollary to his right to a jury trial. 125 In creating this
122 408 N.Y.S.2d 114 (App. Div. 1978).
123 See id. at 115.
124 See id.
125 See id. at 116. In building a classical argument for the right to trial by jury
that ignores the question of cognition, the Carlisle court relied on several
authorities that presume a responsive plaintiff. See N.Y. CONST. art. I § 2
("Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by
constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever ...."); Odum v. Corn
Prods. Ref. Co., 173 I11. App. 348, 352 (1912) ("[W]e know of no law that
prevents interested persons from being present at the hearing of their case, even
though their unfortunate condition was such as to enlist the sympathy of the
jury, and we have not been referred by counsel to any case that, as we think,
announces a different principle."); Ziegler v. Funkhouser, 85 N.E. 984, 986 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1908) ("It is the right of every party litigant to be present in person in
court upon the trial of his own case-the right to be heard by counsel-and
every opportunity should be afforded the parties, who are brought into court to
answer a charge of any kind, to make their defense."); Leonard's of Plainfield,
Inc. v. Dybas, 31 A.2d 496, 497 (N.J. 1943) ("The right of the parties to the
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corollary, the Carlisle court ruled more broadly than necessary,
creating an "unqualified" right to attend jury selection. As a result,
a New York appellate court that encounters an incapacitated
plaintiff in a negligence case will have to overrule Carlisle if it
wants to account for plaintiff's cognition. Worse yet, the holding
in Carlisle misinterpreted the motivation behind the plaintiff
exclusion motion in that case, and cast suspicion over similar
motions that defendants might file in future cases. The Carlisle
court implied that defendants in negligence cases try to exclude
plaintiffs as punishment for hiring an attorney, and reiterated
accordingly that plaintiffs do not forfeit the right to attend all
phases of a trial, simply because they have retained counsel.
126
Plaintiff exclusion motions, though, do not attempt to keep
plaintiffs out of the courtroom because they have retained counsel.
Even the earliest plaintiff exclusion cases refused to allow such
arbitrary exclusion. Nonetheless, the Carlisle court linked the
right to trial by jury to the right to attend trial, and established that
link after an examination of the history of jury trials, dating back to
the Magna Carta. 127  New York's commitment to this
constitutional argument continued in Mason v. Moore.1
28
Connecticut 129 and Oklahoma'30 adopted similar constitutional
cause to be present in person and by counsel at all stages of the trial, except the
deliberations of the jury, is basic to due process.").
126 Compare Carlisle, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 117 (noting that plaintiffs right to attend
trial "is in no way denigrated by the presence of retained or assigned counsel.
The attorney is not the alter ego of his client, but his representative or agent. As
such he may not supplant the client either at his or the court's unbridled
pleasure.") with Scott-Hourigan Co. v. Deprez, 279 N.W.2d 150, 151 (Neb.
1979) (finding no error in a trial court's decision to begin trial in the absence of
plaintiff and his counsel, where plaintiff could not show that he suffered
prejudice and an unfair trial) and Ryfeul v. Ryfeul, 650 P.2d 369, 373-74
(Alaska 1982) (holding that a trial court cannot exclude a party to a divorce from
a modification hearing, simply because it thinks that the party would not
contribute much to the hearing).
127 See Carlisle, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
128 641 N.Y.S.2d 195 (App. Div. 1996).
129 See Rozbicki v. Huybrechts, 589 A.2d 363 (Conn. 1991).
130 See Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 1997 OK 60, 940 P.2d 201. But see Meredith Quinn
Olearchik, Note, Right to a Civil Jury Trial-State Constitutional Right to Civil
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reasons for curtailing plaintiff exclusion.' 3' Indiana subscribed to
this argument in Jordan v. Deery.132  Nevada 133 just recently
became the latest state to ignore that patients in persistent
vegetative states likely did not exist 200 years ago,' 34 instead
signing off on the shibboleth that "the state constitutional right of
trial by jury includes the ancillary right to be present in the
courtroom during both the liability and damage phase of trial. This
is so because without the right to be present, the right to trial by
jury becomes meaningless."'
Relying on the right to trial by jury has both factual and
legal problems. Regarding the factual problems, the plaintiffs in
the cases that created a constitutional right to attend trial have full
cognition, and only physical injuries. Plaintiff in Carlisle, though
a paraplegic, had full mental and verbal capacity.' 36 Connecticut's
Trial by Jury in Indiana Includes the Right to Be Present in the Courtroom.
Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Deery, 778 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. 2002), 35 RUTGERS L.J.
1517, 1526 (2004) (arguing that the Cary court relied on sufficiently different
constitutional provisions that the Indiana Supreme Court should not have relied
on Cary as much as it did).
131 Connecticut's position on plaintiff exclusion actually appears to be somewhat
more conflicted. In Rozbicki the state's highest court did create a constitutional
right to attend. See Rozbicki, 589 A.2d at 365 ("[A] party's constitutional right
to a civil jury trial encompasses the right to be present in the court during all
phases of the trial .... "); But see Wozniak v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., No.
X03CV950502560S, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1547, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct.
June 1, 2001) (unpublished opinion) ("Neither [an unrelated case] nor Rozbicki
involved a party who had no ability to comprehend the trial proceedings.").
132 778 N.E.2d 1264, 1272 (Ind. 2002), reh'g denied, No. 75S05-0106-CV-310,
2003 Ind. LEXIS 287 (2003).
133 See Mainor v. Nault, 101 P.3d 308 (Nev. 2004) (per curiam).
134 See supra note 54 for brief speculation as to why incapacitated plaintiffs did
not transform the plaintiff exclusion concept until modem medicine developed
the technology to keep them alive after their accidents.
131 Mainor, 101 P.3d at 322-23.
136 Accordingly, the focus in Carlisle shifted to whether a mentally competent
plaintiff, who was capable of assisting counsel, could also assist counsel during
jury selection. See Carlisle v. County of Nassau, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114, 117 (App.
Div. 1978). But see Monteleone v. Gestetner Corp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 857, 861
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case law also makes this distinction, 37 and in Oklahoma, the case
that created a constitutional right to attend trial involved a burn
victim whose injuries did not implicate his mental capacity in any
way. 138
Eliminating plaintiff exclusion through the right to a jury
trial also creates two legal problems. The first legal problem is
that courts seeking to eliminate plaintiff exclusion have written
into legal history a right to attend trials that does not exist. The
790-year 3 9 history of the right to a jury trial never mentions, let
alone supports, a categorical right to attend that supercedes all
factual circumstances in a case. The earliest guarantee in Anglo-
American jurisprudence of a right to trial by jury, as it resembles
the guarantee in the Seventh Amendment, lies in the Magna Carta.
At that time, English barons grew tired of King John's high taxes
and capricious administration of justice. 140 After a demand for a
charter of liberties and a capturing of London, the barons
succeeded in forcing the king to grant a series of concessions to his
subjects.141 Among other concessions, the king agreed that judicial
(Sup. Ct. 1988) (making a distinction, based on cognition, that Carlisle did not,
and adopting the Helminski test in granting an exclusion motion). Ultimately,
the Court of Appeals may have to decide exactly where New York stands on the
issue of plaintiff exclusion. See Cruz v. St. Luke-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 722
N.Y.S.2d 490, 491 (App. Div. 2001) (excluding infant children of a plaintiff
decedent from a courtroom during both phases of a medical malpractice action,
even though they were plaintiffs themselves, because "they did not speak
English, were incapable of assisting counsel in the presentation of the case and
since their presence might well have impaired the jury's capacity for objective
consideration of the facts"); Caputo v. Joseph J. Sarcona Trucking Co., 611
N.Y.S.2d 655, 656 (App. Div. 1994) (adopting the Helminski test and excluding
a plaintiff from the liability phase of a negligence trial when "he physically
appeared to be in a state of unawareness" and when a court had declared him
mentally incompetent before the trial began).
137 See Rozbicki, 589 A.2d at 364.
138 See Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 1997 OK 60, 21, 940 P.2d 201, 206 (noting that
plaintiff could recall the incident that burned him, and that the recollection could
prove useful to plaintiffs attorney).
139 Dating back to the Magna Carta in 1215.
140 The British Library, Magna Carta, at http://www.bl.uk/treasures/




action would not proceed against any English subject "except by
the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land."' ' 42
The Magna Carta says nothing about plaintiffs attending such jury
trials; it says only that a jury of peers will judge the accused before
the Crown bears down upon them.
When the American colonists embraced the right to trial by
jury, they neither borrowed a right to attend trial from English
jurisprudence-for no such right existed-nor created their own.
Instead, the colonists simply wanted to make sure that judgments
against them came from their peers, 143 and not from some aloof
imperial power thousands of miles away. 44  After the
Revolutionary War, the Framers left the common-law
145
understanding of jury trials untouched, deciding only to
"preserve"'146 the right as it existed in the centuries following the
Magna Carta. The Framers may have felt motivated to preserve
the right to trial by jury, not out of any particular fondness for jury
trials or attendance at them, but because they perceived that
corruption might have a harder time taking root in part-time juries
142 MAGNA CARTA, cl. 39.
143 In fact, early colonial juries had the power to resolve questions of law as well
as of fact. Thomas Jefferson defended this power; "[t]he reason, he explained,
was that 'the common sense of twelve honest men' enhanced the chances of a
'just decision."' LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIUM OF JUSTICE: ORIGINS OF
TRIAL BY JURY 69 (1999).
144 See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at *4 (Alexander Hamilton), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed83.htm (last visited May 24,
2005) (noting that trials by jury are more useful as defenses against monarchs
than against public officials in a republic, and noting further that "I cannot
readily discern the inseparable connection between the existence of liberty, and
the trial by jury in civil cases.").
145 See Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Deery, 778 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 n.4 (Ind. 2002)
(noting that the colonies felt "entitled to the common law of England, and more
especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of
the vicinage, according to the course of that law" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
146 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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than in full-time finders of fact. 147 The Seventh Amendment, as a
means of preserving an established right and not expanding it,
guarantees only that United States citizens who believe that fellow
citizens have wronged them, have the right to make their case and
express themselves before their peers. 48  To the extent that
plaintiffs must attend trial to ensure a full expression of their
grievances, they must be allowed to attend. To the extent that
plaintiffs' evidence unfairly hurts defendants' ability to express
themselves-that is, to the extent that plaintiffs' evidence unfairly
prejudices the jury-the Seventh Amendment has not allowed
plaintiffs to make their case without restrictions.1 49  More
147 See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at *4 (Alexander Hamilton), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed83.htm (last visited May 24,
2005) (noting that juries "summoned for the occasion" probably would have less
motive to respond to a corrupt influence than "a standing body of magistrates").
148 Overall, the history of the right to trial by jury suggests that the purpose of
the right is to allow a citizen to seek redress of grievance against a fellow citizen
who has done wrong. Put another way, the right to trial by jury gives even the
poorest citizen a chance to right wrongs without resort to tribalistic mob-style
violence. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Cmte. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
179 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("It is not without significance that most of
the provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells
much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice.
Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that
there will be equal justice under law."). This fundamental desire for civilized
justice neither endorses nor rejects plaintiff exclusion.
Note also that the Seventh Amendment's neutral position manifests
itself in two ways. The Supreme Court never has included the Seventh
Amendment in its incorporation doctrine, and never has declared trial by jury a
fundamental right that all states must respect. As a result, states from the time
of the Revolution have had the freedom to regulate the right to trial by jury as
they saw fit. See, e.g., Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1876) (holding that
the right to trial by jury is not a privilege or immunity of national citizenship
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that "[t]he States, so far as this
amendment is concerned, are left to regulate trials in their own courts in their
own way"); THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at *7 (Alexander Hamilton), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed83.htm (last visited May 24,
2005) (arguing that an amendment holding the federal government to a single
standard for jury trials was unnecessary, because the states at that time allowed,
restricted, or forbade jury trials depending on the type of litigation).
149 See Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76, 81 (1919).
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importantly, to the extent that plaintiffs cannot make any
expressions in their own behalf, plaintiffs' presence cannot
implicate the Seventh Amendment unless the sight of plaintiffs in
the courtroom, by itself, would affect the outcome of trials.
When plaintiff presence, by itself, could affect the outcome
of a trial, plaintiffs themselves become demonstrative evidence. 50
Demonstrative evidence that shows the jury the severity of
plaintiffs' injuries deserves full Seventh Amendment protection,
once the jury finds defendants liable.' 51 While the jury assesses
liability, demonstrative evidence cannot answer the abstract
question of whether defendants did something that they ought not
to have done. A doctor who did not act negligently regarding a
child's injuries does not suddenly become negligent because the
child happened to be hurt particularly badly. 52 To say otherwise
slants a jury unfairly against defendants, and when plaintiffs'
presence in a courtroom threatens to do just that, a plaintiff
exclusion motion will level the playing field without implicating
the Seventh Amendment. The history of trial by jury does not
support any other conclusion, and courts have admitted as much by
citing, ironically, that they do not need to cite to any authority to
150 Demonstrative evidence is "[p]hysical evidence that one can see and inspect
(i.e., an explanatory aid, such as a chart, map, and some computer simulations)
and that, while of probative value and usually offered to clarify testimony, does
not play a direct part in the incident in question." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
596 (8th ed. 2004).
151 See Morley v. Super. Ct., 638 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ariz. 1981) ("The plaintiff
should be allowed to prove damages by the most direct evidence available-the
plaintiffs own physical condition. It is true that the jury may still have a bias
against the defendant because of the plaintiff's condition, but the bias in the
damages phase is grounded on relevant evidence.").
152 See Kristy Freeman, Civil Procedure: Exclusion of Injured or Disfigured
Plaintiffs From Trial-Cary v. Oneok, Inc.-A Solution to the Exclusion Issue
or Bad Precedent?, 52 OKLA. L. REv. 109, 122-23 (1999) ("In Cary, the fact of
consequence in the liability portion of the proceedings was whether Oneok was
negligent. Eric's injuries are not relevant to this determination. Eric's injuries
do not tend to make the defendant's negligence more or less probable.").
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eliminate plaintiff exclusion on constitutional grounds.15 3
A secondary legal problem arises from grounding the right
to attend trial exclusively in the right to trial by jury, a problem
that the dissent in Jordan discussed. Specifically, if plaintiffs'
right to attend trial derives only from the right to trial by jury, then
plaintiff exclusion could, theoretically, continue in bench trials.
154
This split authority has both practical and jurisprudential
implications. On the practical side, as the dissent in Jordan
153 See, e.g., Freimann v. Gallmeier, 63 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 1945)
("Citation of authority is not required to sustain the proposition that a party to an
action is entitled to be personally present in court when a trial is held in which
he, or she, is a party of record."), cited in Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Deery, 778
N.E.2d 1264, 1272 (Ind. 2002).
154 Obviously, the issue of a split jurisprudential basis for a right to attend would
arise whenever the parties volunteer to submit themselves to a bench trial.
Additionally, this jurisprudential split requires attention because even an
"inviolate" right to trial by jury, see, e.g., IND. CONST. art. I § 20, does not
automatically lead to a jury trial in all circumstances. See, e.g., FED R. Civ. P.
38(b) (requiring parties to request trial by jury, and only for "any issue triable of
right by a jury"); IND. ST. TRIAL P. 38(a) (2003) ("In case of the joinder of
causes of action or defenses which, prior to said date, were of exclusive
equitable jurisdiction with causes of action or defenses which, prior to said date,
were designated as actions at law and triable by jury-the former shall be triable
by the court, and the latter by a jury, unless waived; the trial of both may be at
the same time or at different times, as the court may direct."); Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 335 (1979) ("A litigant who has lost because of
adverse factual findings in an equity action is equally deprived of a jury trial
whether he is estopped from relitigating the factual issues against the same party
or a new party."). Compare Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73
(1962) ("[W]here both legal and equitable issues are presented in a single case,
'only under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of
the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the
right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of
equitable claims."') (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,
510-511 (1959)) with Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1135 (1992)
(asserting that "parties have no right to jury trial in cases seeking solely
equitable relief') (emphasis added) and id at 1136 (noting that "[wlhen the
United States is a defendant, usually no jury right exists") and WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 87, § 2302.
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mentioned,155 courts like the Jordan court did not want to continue
plaintiff exclusion except for waiver or extreme circumstances. A
jurisprudential split that lets plaintiff exclusion survive would
defeat this intent.
1 56
As for the jurisprudential implications, courts that expand
the right to trial by jury need to find separate sources of authority
for the right to attend analogous proceedings. History suggests
that the rights to trial by jury and by bench derive from different
sources. 157 Bench trials did not reappear widely in trials courts in
this country until the twentieth century.' 58 Even when discussing
151 See Jordan, 778 N.E.2d at 1273 (Boehm, J., dissenting) (observing that "if
the right is derived from the right to a jury trial, it would not be equally available
in a bench trial").
156 The irony of eliminating plaintiff exclusion from jury trials, but not from
bench trials, is that bench trials are not as susceptible to an unfairly prejudicial
trier of fact. See id. at 1273-74 (Boehm, J., dissenting) ("Although I find little
direct relevant authority, it seems to me that the right to be present is at least as
strong in a bench trial where the countervailing factor of fairness to the other
party may be of diminished weight."); see also Ellen E. Sward, Special Issue on
the History of the Trial: A History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51
KAN. L. REV. 347, 358-59 (2003) (noting that bench trials do not require as strict
an enforcement of the rules of evidence, because of a lower chance of unfair
prejudice by the trier of fact).
157 See Sward, supra note 156, at 355 n.50 (noting, in a history of the merger of
law and equity courts in the English legal system, that "[i]n the early English
common law, there were no bench trials. Unless one of the ancient modes of
trial survived and was selected, the jury was the prescribed method of trying
issues of fact until 1854"). In addition to a different history, bench trials reflect
a different motive: expedience. See Samuel R. Gross, Settling for a Judge: a
Comment on Clermont and Eisenberg, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1178, 1181-82
(1992) ("Since bench trials are comparatively cheap, both sides can save money
by waiving a jury .... Judges too prefer bench trials-they are cheaper, less
formal and more flexible, take less court time, and allow the judge to exercise
greater power. In an area of litigation in which bench trials are the rule, judges
may be quick to frown upon a party that insists on a jury.").
158 Compare Susan C. Towne, The Historical Origins of Bench Trials for
Serious Crime, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 123 (1982) ("Although some American
colonies permitted bench trials for felonies, this practice disappeared prior to the
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only jury trials, the intensity of the right to attend fluctuates with
the specific trial context.159 If bench trials and jury trials have
different histories and different purposes, then the history of jury
trials cannot carry over to bench trials. Partially for this reason, the
dissent in Jordan favored grounding the right to attend in due
160process.
B. Procedural limits and extreme circumstances
The second argument against plaintiff exclusion flows from
a concern for plaintiffs' due process rights. This argument
theoretically accepts plaintiff exclusion as an option that should be
available to judges, but then raises the hurdle for the exercise of
the option to practically impossible heights, out of concern for due
process violations. The hurdle is the term "extreme
circumstances." For example, when the Jordan court decided that
defendants no longer could file plaintiff exclusion motions, it left
defendants with a theoretical loophole: barring a voluntary waiver
by plaintiffs, defendants still could keep plaintiff out of the
courtroom if "extreme circumstances" existed. 16 1 The insertion of
this term into Jordan resembles a token conciliatory gesture
toward defendants, given that the court declined to define what the
term means, relative to plaintiff exclusion. 162  Defining when
Revolution . . . .") with Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic
Practice, 89 VA. L. REv. 311, 325 (2003) (noting that bench trials in the
criminal setting did not gain prominence until the 20th century).
9 See Jordan, 778 N.E.2d at 1274 (Boehm, J., dissenting) (noting that an
incarcerated civil litigant's right to attend his civil suit depends on factors such
as the logistics of ferrying plaintiff from jail to the courtroom).
160 See id. at 1274 (Boehm, J., dissenting) ("Thus both precedent and reason lead
me to reject the jury trial right as the source of the right to be present."); id. at
1275 (concluding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
"does not guarantee the right to be present. Rather, it guarantees fundamental
fairness to all parties.").
161 See id. at 1272.
162 See id. at 1272 n.8 ("We decline to articulate a bright-line rule to determine
what are and what are not 'extraordinary circumstances.' Such determinations
must be made on a case-by-case basis. We merely observe that on this record
extraordinary circumstances have not been shown."). Only recently has the
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"extreme circumstances" exist could have enormous implications
for defendants in Indiana and in other jurisdictions' 63 that choose
to adopt such language. Plaintiff exclusion may yet survive in
these jurisdictions if defendants have a low hurdle to clear before
claiming that "extreme circumstances" exist. In contrast, plaintiff
exclusion in jurisdictions that adopt the "extreme circumstances"
qualifier is effectively dead if courts set the hurdle high to prevent
parties from actually clearing it.' 64  One practitioner involved in
Jordan has remarked that "[s]uch a vague standard makes it always
an ex post facto determination by an appellate court. It gives no
real guidance to the trial judge. It would be about as useful to tell
Indiana .Supreme Court given any hint as to what it means by the term "extreme
circumstances." See Niksich v. Cotton, 810 N.E.2d 1003, 1008 (Ind. 2004) ("As
we recently observed in [Jordan], even where the right to a jury trial applies, the
right of a party to be present is not absolute. Rather, under 'extraordinary
circumstances' presence of a party may not be required. An incarcerated
plaintiff may present such circumstances. [Appellant in this case, a prisoner]
may seek to submit the case through documentary evidence, to conduct the trial
by telephonic conference, to secure someone else to represent him at trial, or to
postpone the trial until his release from incarceration. We think the trial court
has wide discretion in selecting any of these options after evaluating the
prisoner's need to be present against concerns of expense, security, logistics and
docket control." (citations omitted)).
163 In addition to embracing constitutional arguments against plaintiff exclusion,
see supra Part V.A, New York adopted the similar term "unusual
circumstances." See Mason v. Moore, 641 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197 (App. Div. 1996).
Oklahoma's approach to extreme circumstances is confusing. Oklahoma bars
plaintiff exclusion absent waiver or extreme circumstances, but also allows
defendants to demonstrate such circumstances by meeting the burdens of the
Helminski test. See Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 1997 OK 60, 13, 940 P.2d 201, 204
(Okla. 1997).
164 One practitioner with whom the author communicates periodically likens the
difficulty of meeting the "extreme circumstances" standard to meeting the
pornography standard of "I'll know it when I see it." Email from Robert M.
Greene, Esq., Partner, Phillips Lytle LLP, to author (Mar. 12, 2004) (on file with
author).
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the trial judge to 'do the right thing."" ' 65
Unfortunately, the case law offers little guidance for
anyone who attempts to define what constitutes extreme
circumstances. The Supreme Court case of Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover 66  reinforces the suspicion that an extreme
circumstances exception serves only as a euphemism for plaintiffs'
absolute right to attend trial. In Beacon Theatres, two California
movie theaters litigated over whether one theater's contracts with a
movie distributor violated antitrust laws, where the contracts
granted exclusive "first-run" access to new movies for an entire
metropolitan area.' 67 A district judge had ruled that defendant
sought only equitable relief, and thus did not have a right to a jury
trial. In reversing the district court's decision and the circuit
court's affirmation, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance
of the right to a jury trial-any limits on that right "should be
scrutinized with the utmost care."'1 68 Essentially, the Court ruled
that plaintiff never loses the right to a jury trial, simply because
plaintiff has mixed the legal claim implicating the jury right with
an equitable claim. 169 The Court did not state its holding that
simply, though. The Court decided to create the theoretical
possibility that "most imperative circumstances"'1 70 could override
plaintiffs right to a jury trial, but then stated that it could not
anticipate what those circumstances would be. 17  No case citing
Beacon Theatres has yet found that imperative circumstances
actually existed under related fact patterns. 7 2
165 Email from Mark Lienhoop, Esq., Partner, Newby Lewis Kaminsky & Jones
LLP, to author (Feb. 24, 2004) (on file with author).
166 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
167 See id. at 503.
168 Id. at 501 (quotation marks omitted).
16 9 See id. at 511.
170 Id.
171 See id.
172 See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Stewart v. KHD
Deutz of Am. Corp., 75 F.3d 1522 (11 th Cir. 1996); Nunez v. Superior Oil
Corp., 572 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978); Reliability Research v. Computer Assocs.
Int'l, 851 F. Supp. 58 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Equity Funding Corp., 396 F.
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Other cases also set a seemingly impossibly high threshold
to meet before extreme circumstances exist.1 73 These cases leave
some clues about the term through the types of examples ruled not
to be extreme. For example, no cause of action for malicious
prosecution exists without extreme circumstances like launching
multiple frivolous suits simultaneously, and harassing an adverse
party, to the point of causing actual damages.' 74 During pre-trial
discovery, a court will dismiss a complaint for failure to follow
discovery orders only when plaintiff knows clearly that failure to
comply will result in dismissal. 175 In the field of elder law, courts
have trouble assessing legal competence in all but the extreme
circumstances of raving or comatose patients. 176 Returning to tort
law and personal injury cases, exceptional circumstances in an
automobile accident refer to whether a driver could have avoided
an accident by doing nothing more than exercising the slightest
degree of care. 177 Medical equipment that can heighten the drama
of a trial, in contrast, generally will not create extreme
circumstances. 178 Helminski, itself a personal injury case, looked
Supp. 1266 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Williams v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 344 F. Supp. 163
(N.D. Miss. 1972); Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 34 F.R.D. 15, 18 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
173Plaintiff exclusion appears to have a lower threshold when a judge feels a
need to maintain decorum. See Cavendish v. Sunoco Service of Greenfield,
Inc., 451 F.2d 1360, 1368 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that a trial judge did not
abuse his discretion to maintain decorum when he ordered plaintiff's four-year
old son removed from the courtroom during the last half of final arguments,
where the boy was making no noise but where the jury allegedly felt distracted
by the boy's playing with a toy truck).
174 See Barreto-Almeyda v. First Nat'l City Bank, 288 F. Supp. 99, 100 (D.P.R.
1968).
175 Rogers v. Charity Hosp., 537 So. 2d 1267, 1268 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
176 See Alison Patrucco Barnes, Elder Law: Beyond Guardianship Reform: A
Reevaluation of Autonomy and Beneficence for a System of Principled Decision-
Making in Long Term Care, 41 EMORY L.J. 633, 689 (1992).
177 See Dolberg v Paltani, 549 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Neb. 1995).
178 See, e.g., Talcott v. Holl, 224 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969) (allowing
plaintiff's attorney to bring in plaintiff just once during trial, on a stretcher, and
for just a few minutes); Sherwood v. City of Sioux Falls, 73 N.W. 913, 914
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at several criminal cases that established that obstreperous
conduct 179 curtails defendants' trial rights, which are not absolute
anyway. 180
Finally, a court will exclude plaintiffs who create extreme
circumstances by disrupting the proceedings. 181 The disruption
must do more than just draw the attention of the trier of fact,
though-plaintiffs' presence must force the court to stop the trial
and address plaintiffs' presence as an independent issue. 182 An
extreme example of disruption of courtroom proceedings occurred
in Kulas v. Flores.183 In Kulas, plaintiff, a prisoner, represented
himself in a Section 1983184 civil rights action. Plaintiff pestered
witnesses so often with irrelevant questions that the trial judge had
to stop and warn plaintiff repeatedly to reach his point faster.' 85
Worse, plaintiff interrupted a particular cross-examination with
frivolous objections so often, that the trial judge stopped the
proceedings at one point and had plaintiff escorted from the
courtroom for the remainder of that cross-examination.186
(S.D. 1898) (allowing plaintiff in a negligence case to enter the courtroom on a
cot, and blaming defendant for possible jury sympathy because "[i]f the verdict
of the jury was sustained by the evidence, as we must assume it was, and
plaintiff's condition was such as to excite sympathy, it was the result of
defendant's negligence, not plaintiff's fault.").
179 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
180 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975); United States v.
Brown, 571 F.2d 980, 986-87 (6th Cir. 1978).
181 See, e.g., Helminski, 766 F.2d 208, 214 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
981 (1985).
182 See Purvis v. Inter-County Tel. & Tel. Co., 203 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1967) (per curiam) (holding that the trial court should not have
excluded plaintiff from the courtroom because his description as
"argumentative, somewhat irrational and of such mental attitude and physical
appearance that the jury might be influenced" was too vague). Sometimes,
though, even short-lived courtroom disruptions will not overcome plaintiff's
right to attend trial. See Kopplin v. Kopplin, 71 N.E.2d 180, 182 (Ill. Ct. App.
1946) (holding that a trial court erred in excluding plaintiff, even after she
interrupted a direct examination to accuse a witness of lying).183 255 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2001).
1 84 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
185 Kulas, 255 F.3d at 785.
186 Id. at 785-86.
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Overall, the "extreme circumstances" argument has two
critical flaws: it begs the question of whether plaintiff exclusion
violates plaintiffs' due process rights, an assumption subject to
debate,' 8 and it is so vague that no one knows how to file or argue
a successful exclusion motion. A little more detail could salvage
the concept, and make it useful when courts that allow the filing of
exclusion motions face adverse circumstances beyond the scope of
the Helminski test. From the cases mentioned above, and from the
general needs of a court trying to run an orderly trial, this article
now will propose specific criteria to help a court determine when
extreme circumstances exist in a plaintiff exclusion trial."' First,
extreme circumstances exist when plaintiffs exhibit any behavior
so loud and disruptive that it drowns out anyone speaking, or
otherwise forces a court to stop the proceedings to address
plaintiffs. Extreme circumstances exist also when plaintiffs'
attendance requires bringing into the courtroom any medical
equipment so large and disruptive (because of sounds, or because
of moving too much furniture around) that it falls beyond any
notion of a reasonable accommodation that disability legislation
might define. If plaintiff be a minor child, too young to testify
under oath even if healthy, then a court can declare that extreme
circumstances exist, and allow the next friends (or whoever
brought the suit on plaintiffs' behalf) to testify for the child. 189
187 Contra Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 213 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 981 (1985).
188 The proposed definition of "extreme circumstances" set forth here can be
considered a fifth step in the plaintiff exclusion test proposed infra in Part VI.
189 See, e.g., Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 1997 OK 60, 1, 940 P.2d 201, 206 (Opala, J.,
dissenting) (arguing to uphold exclusion of a minor plaintiff where "his status is
now and was below that of a nonparty-a person non suijuris whose action was
brought in his name, as it must be, by another (as next friend)"); FED. R. Civ. P.
17(c) ("An infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed
representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem.") (alteration
in original); IND. CODE § 34-9-2-1(2) (2003) (authorizing courts of the state to
allow next friends to sue on a party's behalf); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2017(c)
(2004) ("If an infant or incompetent person does not have a duly appointed
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Additionally, a court can keep plaintiffs out of the courtroom if, for
some reason, some part of the trial requires examining defendants'
confidential business records in camera.190 Finally, a court can
sanction plaintiffs with expulsion from the courtroom if they or
their attorneys knowingly exaggerate or dramatize their injuries,
with intent to sway jury opinion.191 Any one of these criteria can
establish extreme circumstances; extreme circumstances cannot
exist in their absence.
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 19
2
The third argument against plaintiff exclusion holds the
entire concept in violation of the ADA. How the ADA impacts
plaintiff exclusion is an issue of first impression in all jurisdictions;
a few courts have addressed the issue only parenthetically.
193
representative he may sue by his next friend or by a guardian ad litem.")
(alteration in orginal).
190 See Binney & Smith Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3151, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (granting a motion to strip the documents from a
prior proceeding of confidential status, and holding that litigation concerning
popular consumer products "should be available for public scrutiny, absent
exceptional circumstances").
191 Parading a plaintiff may not occur often, yet it can happen, which is why a
trial court needs plaintiff exclusion as a discretionary tool to stop it. See
Helminski, 766 F.2d at 218 n.8 ("While we are mindful that in some instances
counsel may seek to parade a handicapped plaintiff before the jury in a
deliberate attempt to elicit sympathy, we do not believe that this is a common
occurrence. However, should such improper conduct occur, a trial court has the
discretion to preserve courtroom decorum."); Fla. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Jones, 60 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1952) (noting that plaintiff entered the
courtroom of a non-bifurcated trial "when she was on a stretcher and,
apparently, in a weak and stupefied condition and attended by a nurse and
hospital attendant") (alteration in original); Talcott v. Holl, 224 So. 2d 420, 421
(Fla. Ct. App. 1969) (ruling against plaintiff exclusion, where plaintiff entered
the courtroom only once, on a stretcher, and remained in the courtroom for only
a few minutes).
192 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2005).
193 See LeCompte v. Freeport-McMoran, No. 94-437, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6555 (E.D. La. May 12, 1995) (unpublished opinion) (allowing a physically
disfigured teenager to testify at trial, where "[t]his young lady is capable of
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Nonetheless, momentum seems to be building for a pioneer case
that adopts the ADA argument.' 94  The argument subordinating
plaintiff exclusion to the ADA, as advanced by plaintiff
attorneys, 195 proceeds as follows. Congress passed the ADA after
finding that disabled Americans face numerous types of
discrimination. 96  Accordingly, the ADA carries a mandate to
eliminate discrimination occurring solely on the basis of disabled
status. 197  When defendants try to exclude plaintiffs from trials,
they imply that prejudice will occur based solely on plaintiffs'
hearing, understanding, and answering any question posed and is quite candid
and unembarrassed to discuss any matter. She is intelligent, mature and
conducts herself very well."); Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Deery, 778 N.E.2d 1264,
1267 (Ind. 2002); Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 730 A.2d 221, 233
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (finding the allegation of an ADA violation irrelevant
because "the ADA allows for action only against the public entity for
prospective injunctive relief-there is nothing in the ADA that provides a basis
for reversing the judgment of a lower court in a civil dispute between private
parties"), aff'd, 785 A.2d 361 (Md. Ct. App. 2001); cert. Cary v. Oneok, Inc.,
1997 OK 60, 18, 940 P.2d 201, 205.
194 See generally, e.g., Brief for United States as Intervenor, Bowers v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,, 2002 WL 32390595 (3d Cir. 2002) (Nos. 01-4226,
01-4492, 02-1789); Bessie M. Taylor, Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Deery P1. Pet. to
Transfer (2000), at 8-12 (on file with author); Bessie M. Taylor, Jordan v. Deery
Mem. of Law in Support of Pet. To Transfer (2000), at 19-21 (on file with
author); Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, Pet. for Writ of Cert. to the United
States Supreme Court, No. 01-1303, 2002 WL 32134682 (Feb. 2002), cert
denied, 535 U.S. 1055 (2002).
195 See, e.g., Bessie M. Taylor, Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Deery P1. Pet. to Transfer
(2000), at *8-12 (on file with author); Bessie M. Taylor, Jordan ex rel. Jordan v.
Deery Mem. of Law in Support of Pet. To Transfer (2000), at *19-21 (on file
with author).
196 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2005) (finding discrimination "in such critical
areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services,
voting, and access to public services").
'9' See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2005) (calling on Congress "to invoke the
sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities").
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appearance. 198  Excluding plaintiffs simply for their disabled
condition is discrimination based on status, and the ADA forbids
such categorical targeting.1 99 Excluding plaintiffs also cannot be
reconciled with the requirement that state agencies must offer
reasonable accommodations to the disabled.200
Although the ADA argument against plaintiff exclusion
recognizes the nation's sympathy toward the plight of the disabled,
it has four critical flaws that render it ineffective in abolishing
plaintiff exclusion. All four flaws relate to the confusion between
excluding plaintiffs from the courtroom, a priori, because they are
disabled; and excluding from the courtroom people who would
present prejudicial evidence . . . and who just happen to be
disabled. Each flaw merits a closer examination.
1. Plaintiff Exclusion Motions Do Not Target
Plaintiffs for Their Disabled Status Per Se
The first major flaw in the ADA argument is that it
assumes a per se discriminatory animus against the disabled.
Congress crafted the ADA to eliminate disparate treatment against
broad classes within society.20 1  Disparate-impact claims also
198 Admittedly, some defense attorneys move so reflexively to exclude plaintiffs,
that they file the exclusion motion before even having met plaintiff. See, e.g.,
LeCompte, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6555, at *1-2 (noting that "without even so
much as having met Miss LeCompte, Freeport had moved the Court based on
the 'severe deformity' of the child").
199 Plaintiff in Green, in a more dramatic invective, described plaintiff exclusion
as "practically the same as saying: 'No disabled allowed.' The State of
Maryland is telling its disabled citizens: 'As far as we are concerned you do not
exist.' It sends the message that disabled citizens have a lower legal status in
society." Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, Pet. for Writ of Cert. to the United
States Supreme Court, No. 01-1303, 2002 WL 32134682 (Feb. 2002), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 1055 (2002).
200 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local
Government Services, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2005) (construing disabilities as only
physical, not cognitive, and discrimination as a matter only of physical access to
g0vernment services).
1 See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (noting, in an action




receive recognition under the ADA. Congress, however, did not
design the ADA for courtroom civil procedure applied to
individuals as individuals, and not as members of broad classes.2 °3
For plaintiff exclusion to constitute an ADA violation, plaintiffs
would have to be excluded automatically, without a hearing, as
soon as the court found out that plaintiff had a disability. That
exclusion would have to occur either because plaintiff belonged to
the class of disabled individuals, or because the court applied to
plaintiff some observation that was generally true of disabled
people, but not necessarily true of plaintiff. Instead, plaintiff
exclusion is just one tool that can help place both sides of a lawsuit
on equal footing before a jury, when circumstances threaten to
prejudice a jury unfairly against a party.
2. Plaintiffs in Negligence Cases Are Not
Qualified Individuals with a Disability
Another problem with the ADA argument concerns the
understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or [other
protected characteristic].") (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n. 15 (1977)) (alteration in original).
202 See id. at 53 ("Both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims are
cognizable under the ADA.") (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2005)).
203 The Supreme Court has held that analogous statutes pertaining to age and sex
discrimination follow similar analysis. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology
Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 n.7 (2003) (noting that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission issues the same guidelines for
compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the ADA, or the Equal Pay Act of
1963). Accordingly, the focus on individuals that appears in analogous cases
can apply to plaintiff exclusion and alleged violations of the ADA. See Los
Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) ("[Title
VII's] focus on the individual is unambiguous. It precludes treatment of
individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class
Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for
disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply.").
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ability of incapacitated plaintiffs to fit under its definitions. The
ADA sets out to eliminate discrimination against qualified
individuals with a disability that occurs by reason of such
disability.2°4 The ADA defines the term "qualified individual with
a disability" as
[A]n individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, the removal of architectural, communication,
or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary
aids and services, meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or the
participation in programs or activities provided by a
public entity.
20 5
At this point, the inquiry breaks down further into whether
excluded plaintiffs have a disability, and then whether they meet
some kind of eligibility requirement that would warrant the term
"qualified."
Given that plaintiffs under the Helminski test must have
severe cognitive impairments to qualify for exclusion, they would
meet the ADA's definition of "disability" easily.20 6 The inquiry
204 "Subject to the provisions of this title, no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132
(2005).
205 Id.
206 Under the ADA, a plaintiff can have a disability in three different ways.
First, plaintiff can have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2005). Physical or
mental impairment does not include simple physical characteristics such as hair
color; socioeconomic factors such as a prison record; or naturally occurring
factors such as age. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 27-28, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450-51. Physical and mental impairments do include, inter
alia, any conditions that have neurological, musculoskeletal, or psychological
effects. Id. But see Sheridan v. Michels, 282 B.R. 79, 92 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002)
(holding that a dopamine deficiency does not constitute a disability), vacated on
other grounds by 362 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 2004); Access Now v. Town of Jasper,
Vol. XXIII
Plaintiff Exclusion
into whether the ADA shields plaintiffs from exclusion motions
thus shifts to whether they meet the ADA's definition of
"qualified." To qualify for ADA protection, as noted above,
plaintiffs must meet the essential eligibility requirements of a
government program or service, with or without reasonable
accommodation. Terms such as government programs or services
connote direct aid, outputs from a public entity that a recipient
takes without a contract or any hint of a quid pro quo.207 Just as
268 F. Supp. 2d 973, 980-81 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (holding that mild spina bifida is
not a disability under the ADA).
Second, plaintiff can have a record of a limiting physical or mental
impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2005). Third, plaintiff can qualify as
disabled if others perceive her as having a limiting physical or mental
impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2005).
207 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 37 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 318-19 (discussing the motivation for passing the ADA in the context of
"recipients of Federal assistance" and "funding sources" of government
programs); see also Penn. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998)
(holding that a prison library is a public service because prisoners "are free to
take or leave [it]"); Bay Area Addiction v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 731-
32 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that zoning is a public service because it is a normal
government function in line with Congress's broad mandate to eliminate
discrimination); Loritz v. CMT Blues, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17127 at *6-7
(S.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that prisoner vocation and rehabilitation programs are
government services because the prisoners receive training in how to function as
lawful citizens when their sentences expire); Filush v. Town of Weston, 266 F.
Supp. 2d 322, 328 (D. Conn. 2003) (holding that hiring and promotions fell
under the employment provisions of Title I of the ADA, not the public services
provisions of Title II); New York v. County of Delaware, 82 F. Supp. 2d 12, 17-
18 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that running polling places constitutes a
government service); Soto v. City of Newark, 72 F. Supp. 2d 489, 494 (D.N.J.
1999) (holding that conducting weddings constituted a government service);
Saunders v. Horn, 960 F. Supp. 893, 899 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that police
and fire services constitute government services); Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar
Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430, 442 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that granting law
licenses constitutes a government service); Galloway v. Super. Ct., 816 F. Supp.
12 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that jury constitutes a government service).
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208
obtaining a job does not constitute a receipt of public services, a
government-run court does not equate to a public benefit program
that offers direct aid to plaintiffs the way that, say, home heating
assistance does. Plaintiffs would argue even more implausibly to
the contrary if they referred to a federal court. The ADA applies
only to state and local governments; while state and local courts
would fall under ADA purview, federal courts would not.
20 9
Even if courts constituted some kind of public service or
benefit, no reasonable accommodation exists that the ADA would
impose on defendants in plaintiff exclusion cases. The federal
regulations implementing the ADA require public entities to make
reasonable modifications to their operations to accommodate the
disabled, "unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program, or activity.' ' 210 What would a reasonable accommodation
of a judiciary system mean, though, for an incapacitated plaintiff
who cannot communicate with counsel and may not even
understand that something called a trial is occurring?2 1' A court
208 See Zimmerman v. Ore. Dep't of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir.
1999).
209 See Sheridan v. Michels, 282 B.R. 79, 92 (Bankr. App. Panel for 1st Cir.
2002), vacated on other grounds by 362 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 2004).
210 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2005).
211 See Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, 366 Md. 597, 617-18 (Md. 2001)
(holding that the federal regulations implementing the ADA, 28 C.F.R. §§
35.101-35.190 (2005), exist to force public entities to make reasonable
accommodations regarding physical access, and that "[n]owhere in these
regulations is there stated, or even suggested, that, where the complaint concerns
the exclusion of a disabled person from the courtroom by judicial ruling,
reversal of the judgment entered in the case is a permissible remedy ....
[i]ndeed, the inappropriateness of such a remedy becomes unmistakably clear
when one considers that a violation of the ADA based on wrongful exclusion
from a courtroom does not depend on the excluded person's status as a party in
the pending case; a member of the public who is excluded from a public
courtroom because of his/her disability has the same complaint under the ADA
as a party excluded by reason of disability. Surely, it would be inappropriate,
and not within the contemplation of Congress, to vacate judgments entered in
cases proceeding in the courthouse because a disabled member of the public was




could not compensate, through reasonable accommodations, for
the inability to communicate by assisting counsel plan trial
strategy. Assisting counsel would fundamentally alter the court's
role as an impartial arbiter between the competing arguments from
each side. l2 Alternatively, a court could focus on the more narrow
accommodation of bringing plaintiffs into the courtroom for the
duration of a trial. Even then, a court would fundamentally alter its
environment if it knowingly permitted the presence of plaintiffs
who presented a substantial prejudice risk to defendants. Plaintiffs
whose attorneys are on their own during trial, because of their
inability to communicate, will suffer no disadvantage during trial
proceedings that would require the kind of accommodation that
federal regulations contemplate.21 3 Ultimately, the reasonable
accommodation for plaintiffs lacking capacity even to launch the
suit would be to let guardians or next friends file and manage the
suit, on their behalf 2
1 4
212 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2005) (ordering public entities to operate so as to
be readily accessible to the disabled, but not requiring a public entity "to take
any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the
nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative
burdens .... ).
213 See Memmer v. Marin County Cts., 169 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a visually impaired plaintiff suffered no disadvantage during pre-
trial proceedings that did not require her to read any documents or examine any
exhibits); cf Hatch v. Sec'y of Me., 879 F. Supp. 147, 148 (D. Me. 1995)
(holding that Maine did not have to issue a driver's license to plaintiff, where
plaintiff could not show that any accommodation of his visual impairment
would allow him to drive safely).
214 See FED R. Civ. P. 17(c) ("An infant or incompetent person who does not
have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian
ad litem.").
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3. Plaintiffs in Negligence Cases Do Not Face
the Type of Discrimination that Congress
Attempted to Eliminate Through Passage of
the ADA
Plaintiff exclusion cannot constitute discrimination
against the disabled, in part because granting a plaintiff exclusion
motion does not amount to the kind of conduct that Congress
targeted when enacting the ADA. Congress passed the ADA to
address pervasive 2 15 discrimination against the disabled in many
216
areas of public life. Much of the discrimination that Congress
identified concerns physical access to public services, and the
physical barriers that keep the disabled from meaningful
215 In writing the ADA's statement of purpose, Congress went as far as to
describe the disabled as a "discrete and insular minority" who have a history of
unequal treatment and political powerlessness. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(7) (2005).
216 Congress identified areas of public life such as employment, housing, public
accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation,
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services. 42
U.S.C. § 12101(3) (2005). Additionally, before passing the ADA Congress
heard testimony from individuals who shared their experiences with
discrimination. One witness noted that "[w]hen I was 5 my mother proudly
pushed my wheelchair to our local public school, where I was promptly refused
admission because the principal ruled that I was a fire hazard. I was forced to
go into home instruction, receiving one hour of education twice a week for 31/2
years." H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 311. The Education Committee also noted, for example, that
"in March, 1988, the Washington Post reported the story of a New Jersey zoo
keeper who refused to admit children with Down's [sic] Syndrome because he
feared they would upset the chimpanzees." Id. Finally, the Education
Committee noted that disabled people faced lower employment rates and lower
salaries primarily because "their major obstacles are not inherent in -their
disabilities, but arise from barriers that have been imposed externally and
unnecessarily." Id. at 35, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 316-17 (quoting
Sen. Lowell Wiecker, Testimony Before the House Subcomm. on Select Educ.




enforcement, through the courts, of their constitutional rights. 217
Concern about physical access affects the judiciary only to the
extent that states should "weigh the fundamental importance of
access to the courts to our justice system, that the perpetuation of
the current physical barriers force people with disabilities to either
forgo their right to be present in court or be carried into court, and
that the remedy is often inexpensive and simple."218  Excluding
plaintiffs out of concern for jury prejudice does not constitute the
sort of physical barrier that would impede physical access to court
219buildings. No court to date has expanded the concept of
physical barriers beyond the literal meaning of a physical structure
that prevents disabled people from entering and exiting
reasonably. 220  At most, courts have expanded the concept of
221
physical access to psychiatric disorders,22  which Congress
intended to include in the ADA. 222 Such disorders have an
217 See Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 682 (6th Cir. 2003), af'd, 541 U.S.
509 (2004). See generally H.R. REP. No. 101-485(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267 (noting that many of the problems that the disabled face
concern physical access to public accommodations and public transportation).
218 Lane, 315 F.3d at 682.
219 See Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525, 534 (W.D. Ark. 1998);
Galloway v. Super. Ct., 816 F. Supp. 12, 18-19 (D.D.C. 1993); Green v. N.
Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, 785 A.2d 361, 372 (Md. 2001) (citing Layton v. Elder,
143 F.3d 469, 472-73 (8th Cir. 1998); People v. Caldwell, 603 N.Y.S.2d 713,
715-16 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1993)).
220 See Green, 785 A.2d at 372 ("Whether the exclusion of a disabled person
from a civil court trial, not by reason of some physical barrier but in order to
avoid disruption or prejudice, would constitute a violation of the ADA is as yet
unclear. No case deciding that issue has been cited to us by any of the parties or
amici, and, like the Court of Special Appeals, we have been unable to find
one.").
221 See State v. P.E., 664 A.2d 1301, 1305 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding that
failure to appoint counsel for a mentally ill defendant, who insisted on
proceeding pro se but lacked the mental capacity to do so, violated the ADA's
reasonable accommodation requirement).
222 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 27-28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 450-51 ("[Physical or mental impairment] also means any mental or
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arguably physical origin,223 and are distinguishable from pre-trial
exclusion motions that courts consider on the merits.
4. Sovereign Immunity Would Bar Legal or
Equitable Claims under the ADA
The fourth critical flaw with the ADA argument against
plaintiff exclusion is that plaintiffs will have no applicable remedy
under the ADA, should they litigate in response to the granting of
an exclusion motion.224 Plaintiffs would have to litigate separately
from the original negligence action, if they alleged that the
granting of a plaintiff exclusion motion violated the ADA.225 At
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.").
223 See, e.g., JAMES H. SCULLY, PSYCHIATRY 6 (3d ed. 1996) (noting the
importance of the clinical laboratory in screening patients for underlying
medical conditions that may be inducing the psychiatric symptoms, monitoring
blood levels of psychotropic medications, and identifying biological markers
that aid diagnosis and treatment).
224 Cf., e.g., FED R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (creating grounds for dismissal of an action
for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted").
225 Plaintiffs could appeal a granting of a plaintiff exclusion motion on the
grounds that the trial court employed originally-the likelihood of jury
prejudice. In this context, plaintiffs could argue, within the same action and
without naming government entities as separate parties, that jury prejudice is not
nearly as likely in the case at bar as the trial judge thought. The drive to
eliminate plaintiff exclusion through the ADA does not argue so narrowly,
though. See supra note 183 (discussing attempts by some plaintiffs' attorneys to
disparage plaintiff exclusion as an attempt to reduce the disabled to second-class
citizens). According to the argument against plaintiff exclusion, a court granting
an exclusion motion will have done more than abuse its discretion, see BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 11 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the abuse of discretion standard as
"[a]n appellate court's standard for reviewing a decision that is asserted to be
grossly unsound, unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence"), or err
as a matter of law. The court will have taken an action that denied plaintiffs'
constitutional rights, leaving them eligible for relief apart from any relief
connected to the alleged negligence.
The original negligence action, though, almost certainly will not have
named as a defendant the public entity that allegedly violated the ADA; besides,
lumping a subsequent and distinct wrongdoing in a pre-existing suit would make
sense. Thus, plaintiffs alleging an ADA violation from the granting of an
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that point, sovereign immunity would end the action. Plaintiffs
alleging harm from the granting of an exclusion motion would not
be able to sue the state in question in federal court for legal
relief.226  Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity from
legal relief, but only when it clearly intends to do so and when it
acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.
227
Regarding the ADA, Congress has met the first part of the
abrogation test by writing its intent explicitly in the ADA.228
exclusion would have to commence a new action and name the relevant public
entity. See Goldberg v. Marc's Disc. Store, No. 79173, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS
200, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (requiring that the public entity be a named
party in a Title II ADA action, and declining "to create a new means of ADA
enforcement that was not adopted by Congress, or included by the Attorney
General in the regulations adopted to implement the ADA") (construing 42
U.S.C. § 12133 (2004); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)-(k), 2000e-16 (2004); 29
U.S.C. § 794(a) (2004); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101-190 (2005)). Commencing the
ADA action would have to follow a specific protocol. See In re Rodriguez, No.
98CA007073, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3517, at *22 (Aug. 4, 1999) (unreported
opinion) (citations omitted) (noting that an ADA action "begins with filing a
complaint with a designated agency. If appropriate, the agency will refer the
case to the Department of Justice, which may file suit in a federal district court.
An alternative procedure is for a private individual to directly initiate an action,
with or without waiting for the federal administrative procedure to run its
course. The action may be in equity, which indicates that there is a possibility of
enjoining a public entity from taking action in violation of the ADA."); see also
Goldberg, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 200, at *4-5 (citing Rodriguez).
226 See U.S. CONST. amend. 11 ("The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150
(1909) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment applies to citizens suing their
own states in federal court); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001)
("The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting
States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.") (citing Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)).
227 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363 (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73).
228 See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2005) ("A State shall not be immune under the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this Act.");
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Congress likely would fail the second part of the test as it applies
to Title 11229 and plaintiff exclusion,230 just as it failed that part of
the test as it applies to Title 1.231 Congress cannot rely on Article I
of the Constitution for abrogation authority, 232 but may rely on its
authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 233 Congress may
not invoke its Fourteenth Amendment abrogation authority,
without documenting an extensive history of state conduct that
Garrett at 364 (citing the abrogation section of the ADA); 42 U.S.C. §
12 101(b)(4) (2005) (invoking authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).
229 Courts often refer to the ADA by the titles that it contained in its original
text, apart from subsequent classification under United States Code. Title I of
the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2005), prohibits discrimination in the area of
employment. See, e.g., Laura Hartman, The Disabled Employee and Reasonable
Accommodation Under the Minnesota Human Rights Act: Where Does
Absenteeism Attributable to the Disability Fit into the Law?, 19 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 905 (1993) (reviewing the Title I litigation posture and arguing that
blocks of disability time after surgeries do not constitute absenteeism). Title II,
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2005), prohibits discrimination in government services.
Title III, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2005), prohibits discrimination in places of public
accommodation. See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001)
(reviewing the Title III litigation posture and allowing a professional golfer with
a circulatory disorder in his leg to use a cart while competing). Plaintiff
exclusion would implicate Title II of the ADA, if it violated the ADA at all.
230 Whether Title II exceeded congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment remained an open question after
Garrett. The U.S. Supreme Court recently answered the question partially,
regarding physical access to the courts and a wheelchair-bound man's refusal to
crawl up stairs to enter a courthouse. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978
(2004). Lane does not resolve whether Congress could abrogate state sovereign
immunity in response to motion practice that a court resolves on the merits.
231 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 (announcing the holding that suits for money
damages under Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
232 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) ("The
Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I
cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal
jurisdiction.").
233 See U.S. CONST. amend. 14 § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of
state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citation omitted).
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offends the Fourteenth Amendment. 234  An extensive history of
states discriminating against the disabled does not exist in the text
of the ADA: the congressional statement of purpose focuses on
conduct by private individuals and entities. 235  Without a more
detailed finding that states have discriminated against the disabled,
any relief that plaintiffs sought under the Title II of the ADA
would be disproportionate to the alleged harm flowing from an
exclusion motion granted pursuant to the Helminski test.236 Thus,
Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity under Title II
of the ADA.237 Plaintiffs who endeavor to seek monetary damages
234 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 (noting that congressional authority to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment "is appropriately exercised only in response to state
transgressions" and that "[t]he legislative record of the ADA, however, simply
fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state
discrimination in employment against the disabled.").
235 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2005) (describing how the disabled face various
forms of discrimination that Congress wants to address through the ADA);
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369 ("The record assembled by Congress includes many
instances to support such a finding [of discrimination against the disabled]. But
the great majority of these incidents do not deal with the activities of States.");
see also Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020, 1034 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
that "Title II's accommodation requirement appears to be an attempt to prescribe
a new federal standard for the treatment of the disabled rather than an attempt to
combat unconstitutional discrimination. In this respect, Title II resembles the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which the Supreme Court struck down ....
Thus, Title II is not a valid abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity."' (citations omitted).
236 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 ("Congress is the final authority as to desirable
public policy, but in order to authorize private individuals to recover money
damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the
States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by
Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation. Those
requirements are not met [for Title I], and to uphold the [ADA's] application to
the States would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid
down by this Court in [prior cases]. Section 5 does not so broadly enlarge
congressional authority.").
237 See Jones v. Dep't of Welfare, 164 F. Supp. 2d 490, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(holding that the then-new Supreme Court holding in Garrett "is clearly
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against states for discrimination against the disabled can seek
alternative means of maintaining an action, such as having the
federal government serve as plaintiff238 or suing under state
laws.
2 39
Plaintiffs excluded from trials could try to sue states in
federal court for equitable relief,240 but the specific performance
applicable to this case and requires a reversal of our earlier conclusion that
Congress abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title II of the
ADA"); State v. Rendon, 832 So. 2d 141, 146 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
the state of Florida could collect a fee for handicapped driver placards, where
Garrett maintained Florida's sovereign immunity from individual suits under
Title II, and where Garrett's defense of sovereign immunity rendered a ban on
such fees, under 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2005), unconstitutional), vacated by,
remanded by 541 U.S. 1059 (2004). The U.S. Supreme Court vacated Rendon
to allow Florida appellate courts to consider the possible impact of the new Lane
decision, but even Lane likely will not permit Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity over reasonable administrative fees. But see Dare v.
California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that California may not
charge fees for handicapped driver placards because Title II does abrogate state
sovereign immunity).
238 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9 (explaining that even when the Eleventh
Amendment bars an action, an individual may seek relief through state courts,
through an action where the United States is a plaintiff, or through an Ex parte
Young application for equitable relief).
239 See id. at 368 n.5 ("It is worth noting that by the time that Congress enacted
the ADA in 1990, every State in the Union had enacted such measures. At least
one Member of Congress remarked that 'this is probably one of the few times
where the States are so far out in front of the Federal Government, it's not
funny."') (citation omitted).
240 See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 166 (1909) (allowing individuals to seek
equitable, though not legal, relief against their own states because "[s]uch
remedy is undoubtedly the most convenient, the most comprehensive, and the
most orderly way in which the rights of all parties can be properly, fairly and
adequately passed upon"). Congress codified a waiver of sovereign immunity
for any plaintiff seeking equitable relief against any federal officer, thus
superseding Ex parte Young to this extent. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2005) ("A
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled
to judicial review thereof An action in a court of the United States seeking relief
other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or
employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of
legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground
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that they likely would request could force a court to override what
it deemed a legitimate application of the rules of evidence
concerning prejudicial evidence.24' Plaintiffs under these
circumstances should not be allowed to rewrite the rules of
evidence, especially without proposing how to deal with legitimate
concerns about the impact of plaintiff presence on a jury.
Additionally, the Federal Anti-Injunction Act242 already prevents a
federal court from micromanaging the ongoing case of a state
court.24 3 "Surely, it would be inappropriate, and not within the
contemplation of Congress, to vacate judgments entered in cases
proceeding in the courthouse because a disabled member of the
public was wrongfully excluded from entering or remaining in the
courthouse or in particular courtrooms."
244
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Jordan court opined
correctly that plaintiff exclusion survives the ADA.245 More
broadly, all four arguments against plaintiff exclusion, as discussed
throughout this part, fail to understand that plaintiff exclusion
arose as a practical response to an unprecedented fact pattern in
negligence litigation. Nonetheless, plaintiff exclusion developed
before passage of the ADA, and courts should seriously consider
the ADA's general concern that the disabled should not face
discrimination because of factors beyond their control. In a nod to
that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable
party.").
241 Cf id. at 163 (holding that the right to seek injunctions against state officials
"does not include the power to restrain a court from acting in any case brought
before it, either of a civil or criminal nature ... and an injunction against a state
court would be a violation of the whole scheme of our government").
242 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2005).
243 "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." Id.
244 Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, 785 A.2d 361, 373 (Md. Ct. App. 2001).
245 See Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Deery, 778 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (Ind. 2002) ("In
fact, the weight of authority suggests that the Helminski test has survived
enactment of the ADA.").
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24the "spirit" of the ADA, 246 the final part of this article will
combine safeguards that various jurisdictions have developed into
a single, enhanced plaintiff exclusion doctrine that all jurisdictions
can apply.
PART VI: REAFFIRMING HELMINSKI: A PROPOSAL FOR
ENHANCED PLAINTIFF EXCLUSION
Amazingly, the Helminski test already accomplished what
the ADA later set out to do, in that defendants in negligence trials
never could exclude plaintiffs for physical injuries alone, and never
could exclude plaintiffs by simply pointing out that they had
cognitive impairments.247 Still, the passage of the ADA and the
development of additional plaintiff safeguards248 in the last twenty
years 249 make the Helminski test due for some touch-up work.
This article now proposes rearranging some of the procedures in
the Helminski test, and crystallizing Helminski into a discrete set of
steps. The steps in this proposed Enhanced Plaintiff Exclusion
Test (EPET) can guide a judge in a negligence trial, and let
attorneys know the standard by which a court will assess their
motions.
Step 1: Bifurcation. A personal injury trial must have
separate liability and damages phases before a court can consider
excluding plaintiff.250 The negligence cases that have supported
plaintiff exclusion already have featured bifurcated trials, and this
246 See LeCompte v. Freeport-McMoran, No. 94-437, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6555, at *3 n.1 (E.D. La. May 12, 1995) (unpublished opinion) ("Indeed, the
court questions the legality of barring an individual from open court based on
her physical impairment alone. While such an action might not be a specific
violation of the ADA, it certainly contravenes the very spirit of the law.").
247 See Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 215 (6th Cir. 1985) ("We agree
with the proposition . . . that a plaintiffs physical condition alone does not
warrant his exclusion from the courtroom during any portion of the
?roceedings."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981 (1985).
8 See infra Step 4.
249 That is, the time that has passed since the court issued Helminski in 1985.
250 Unlike plaintiff exclusion itself, which originated in the common law,
bifurcation of trials has statutory support. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
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requirement should continue.25' Defendants must file for
bifurcation and bear the burden of proving that bifurcation will
serve some meaningful purpose-clarity, or enhancement of
judicial economy,252 for example. Defendants cannot use as a
reason for bifurcation the chances of proving jury prejudice at a
later EPET stage. Taking away possible future prejudice as
grounds for bifurcation would not represent a departure from the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 3 because avoiding prejudice
would remain the ultimate motive for bifurcation. EPET simply
would require defendants to name some other reason immediately,
to avoid a speculative situation in which defendants could obtain a
benefit immediately in exchange for something that they might not
be able to prove later. Forcing defendants to come up with
independent grounds for bifurcation will protect plaintiffs, because
defendants will not be able to gain both bifurcation and exclusion
from a single allegation that they would prove only later, if they
succeed in proving it at all.
When advancing a reason for bifurcating a trial, defendants
must prove that the evidence between the proposed liability and
251 See Helminski, 766 F.2d at 212 (trial to be bifurcated as soon as last expert
witness testifies); Morley v. Super. Ct., 638 P.2d 1331, 1332 (Ariz. 1981) (trial
was bifurcated); Dickson v. Bober, 130 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Minn. 1964) (trial
technically was not consolidated but the jury had not reached the question of
damages).
252 See 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2390 (2004) ("A competent study concludes that [bifurcated
cases] take 20% less time than do cases tried routinely, with the liability and
damage issues submitted simultaneously to the jury. The same data show,
however, that although defendants win in 42% of the cases tried routinely, they
win in 79% of the cases in which the liability issue is submitted alone. These
figures suggest that juries are moved by sympathy when they have heard
evidence of the extent of the plaintiff's injuries and that this influences their
decision on the liability issue."); Kisteneff v. Tiernan, 514 F.2d 896 (1st Cir.
1975) (per curiam) (allowing trial bifurcation to prevent delaying a trial until
one medical expert could arrive and testify).
253 See FED R. Civ. P. 42(b) (authorizing trial bifurcation "in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice .... ") (emphasis added).
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damages phases will not overlap. If evidence from an eventual
damages phase somehow relates to the liability phase, then
plaintiff must have a chance to present a full case at the earlier
stage. As for timing, bifurcation in a negligence trial cannot occur
after a trial begins.254 The jury will have seen plaintiff by that
time, and plaintiff exclusion would be pointless.255
Step 2: Filing the exclusion motion. Defendants must move
for exclusion within some period of time after a court grants a
bifurcation motion, and always before a trial begins.
256
Theoretically, defendants could file for exclusion at any time
during the liability phase of trial, as long as the jury has not seen
plaintiff yet. Requiring an earlier motion gives plaintiffs ample
notice, which will allow plaintiffs to contemplate which of the
possible safeguards, described below, to invoke. Requiring
defendants to move for exclusion before trial also serves the
interests of judicial economy. An exclusion motion granted
improperly during trial may cause irreversible error and force the
parties to start all over again, with a new jury.
Step 3: Exclusion hearing. No exclusion motion should
254 An absolute deadline obviates the need for one of the prejudice debates that
occurred in Helminski. In Helminski, defendant did not move for bifurcation
and exclusion until plaintiff presented his final expert witness, and counsel
subsequently announced his intent to bring plaintiff to the stand as a witness.
The court then realized that the bifurcation request should have come earlier.
See Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 211-12 (6th Cir. 1985).
The Helminski court rejected defendant's concern that plaintiffs
counsel sprung plaintiff on them, as a surprise witness. See id. at 211 n.2.
Generally, though, surprise witnesses can be a concern in plaintiff exclusion
trials, if defendant loses the right to move for bifurcation after a trial begins.
Thus, under EPET courts would not allow plaintiffs to testify at trial for any
reason, without notice to defendants before trial.
255 For this reason, EPET places bifurcation ahead of proving jury prejudice, the
opposite of what Helminski did. Demonstrating likely jury prejudice becomes a
heart-rending academic debate if the court ultimately can do nothing about it. A
court should know in advance that it has the power to correct any prejudice that
defendants offer later.
256 Under EPET, plaintiff exclusion after the start of a trial could occur only if
plaintiff meets the criteria for "extreme circumstances" described earlier in this
article. See supra Part V.
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issue without a hearing on the merits, which plaintiff must attend.
The court should observe plaintiff directly, and not through
documents, photos, or "day in the life" videos.257 "Day in the life"
videos, which rarely depict all of plaintiff's activities from dawn to
dusk,258 can include many techniques to enhance the sympathy of
the court beyond what the judge would feel in plaintiffs
presence. 25 9  Direct observation will give the court a chance to
calculate for itself how likely a jury would blur liability and
damages, and hold defendants liable because of the severity of the
injuries.
As for the merits of the motion, defendant will bear the
burden of proving each of two distinct points. First, defendant
must prove that plaintiff suffers from a cognitive impairment that
257 A "day in the life" video is a short film documenting the activities and,
presumably, the struggles of a plaintiff in a negligence suit. The video aims to
give the trier of fact a better understanding of the alleged suffering that plaintiff
endures constantly. See, e.g., Cisarik v. Palos Comm. Hosp., 579 N.E.2d 873,
874 (Ill. 1991) (allowng the use of "day in the life videos" because they
constitute a form of demonstrative evidence). But see Gregory T. Jones, Lex,
Lies & Videotape, 18 U. ARK. LrTrLE ROCK L. REV. 613, 638-39 (1996) ("By
definition, a day-in-the-life documentary is problematic. The underlying
concept is that the video accurately portrays a 'typical' day when, in fact, there
may be no such thing .... While virtually the same problem arises with all
evidence that is not equally accessible to all parties, a real danger posed by the
admission of day-in-the-life videos stems from the lack of any practical restraint
on how the jury will use the information contained therein. In short, despite a
judge's limiting instruction, the potential exists that jurors may view that which
is supposed to be mere illustrative evidence as substantive evidence. Moreover,
jurors may unconsciously fill in gaps in the proof with whatever happens to be
shown in the video."). (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
258 See 39 AM. JUR. Trials § 4 (2004) (noting that attorneys who decide to
produce documentaries about plaintiffs should strive to depict the full extent of
plaintiffs' disabilities and diminution in quality of life, and that the full range of
plaintiffs' disabilities rarely, if ever, manifest themselves in any one 24-hour
span).
259 See generally id. §§ 37-59 (describing low-angle shooting, camera fades,
lighting, and other means by which plaintiffs' attorneys can amplify the
emotional impact of documentaries about their clients).
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prevents meaningful 26° communication. 26 1  Out of respect for
Helminski, the ADA, and plaintiff's due process rights, defendant
cannot exclude plaintiff for purely physical injuries that allow for
communication with counsel.26 2  Second, defendant must prove
263
that the mere sight of plaintiff's injuries will prejudice a jury.
The alleged prejudice must exceed a threshold beyond which a set
of instructions to the jury could not compensate. 264  The alleged
jury prejudice also must be something that any reasonable juror
would feel, especially when encouraged to do so.265 On this point,
260 For the purposes of EPET, "meaningful communication" shall mean any
communication, offered in response to communication from counsel, that would
help counsel determine what events to emphasize, which witnesses to interview,
and which motions to file; or that would otherwise help counsel manage
plaintiffs trial.
26 1 This requirement comes at a later point in the Helminski test; it comes first in
EPET because even Helminski says that prejudice from plaintiff presence is
irrelevant if plaintiff can communicate with counsel. See Helminski, 766 F.2d at
216-17.
262 Communication with counsel almost always will be possible if plaintiffs
injuries were strictly physical. See generally, e.g., JEAN-DOMINIQUE BAUBY,
THE DIVING BELL AND THE BUTTERFLY (Jeremy Leggatt trans., Knopf 1997)
(describing one man's ordeal with Locked-in Syndrome, a rare and crippling
stroke to the brain stem that left him unable to communicate with the outside
world, except by blinking his left eyelid; the patient wrote the book himself,
dictating each letter of each word by blinking).
263 See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 324 (6th Cir. 1988).
264 Unfortunately, instructions designed to minimize jury sympathy, proposed
often as an alternative to plaintiff exclusion, probably won't work if the jury
can't understand them. Compare Sokol, supra note 4, at 213 ("Sympathy may
also be controlled using pretrial voir dire to eliminate potential jurors, who, in
counsel's mind, will likely succumb to sympathy.") with Holloran, supra note 4,
at 352 ("One author went as far as describing jury instructions as 'complex and
grammatically constructed in the most confounding way, rife with subordinate
clauses and double negatives.' Juries tend to comprehend judicial instructions at
an appallingly low level. One court has gone so far as to state that the
presumption that jurors understand and follow the court's instructions seems
highly artificial.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
265 For example, plaintiff attorneys at trial often disguise appeals to sympathy by
describing plaintiffs plight, but then referring ostensibly to jurors' sense of
"responsibility." See Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates
Help Jurors Think About Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 61, 84 (1995). Cf In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin"
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defendants can invoke procedural and evidentiary rules as
necessary.
266
Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1222-23 (S.D. Ohio 1985) ("A trial court
is always faced with the same inherent problem. Trial attorneys do not seek an
impartial jury. They seek a sympathetic jury. While it may be assumed that
under the adversarial system the two efforts will cancel each other out and that,
in fact, a fair and impartial jury will be impaneled, attempts to engender
sympathy will always continue."). Attorneys also can induce prejudice in juries
indirectly, by screening for jurors whose inexperience with the issues at hand
leaves them more vulnerable to emotional appeals. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith,
Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and
Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 503 (1997) ("Modem exemption
statutes and peremptory challenges both serve to remove individuals who might
be experienced in the field that is the subject of the lawsuit or who might be
more qualified to serve as jurors. Furthermore, individuals who might overcome
inexperience because of better educational background, for example, are often
weeded out of the jury pool."). But see Linda Miller Atkinson, When Plaintiffs
Can't Speak for Themselves, 41 TRIAL 60, 62 (Jan. 2005) ("The real problem
created by a severely injured plaintiffs attendance in court is not related to
sympathy-in fact, it is quite the opposite. Most jurors react with distaste to the
brain-damaged or grossly disfigured plaintiff. They may involuntarily turn
away in disgust or embarrassment, or they may believe that your client's
situation is so hopeless that no verdict can possibly help.").
266 Jury sympathy for a plaintiff in a trial can have evidentiary implications.
Plaintiffs presence in the courtroom, though not submitted to the court as
formal evidence, nonetheless constitutes demonstrative evidence of the injuries
sustained. "Demonstrative evidence (a model, map, photograph, X-ray, etc.) is
distinguished from real evidence in that it has no probative value in itself, but
serves merely as a visual aid to the jury in comprehending the verbal testimony
of a witness." W.R. Smith v. Ohio Oil Co., 134 N.E.2d 526, 530 (Ill. App. Ct.
1956). "If/it appears that the exhibit was used for dramatic effect, or emotional
appeal, rather than factual explanation useful to the reasoning of the jury, this
should be regarded as reversible error .. " Id. at 531. See also Lillie v. United
States, 953 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a judicial view in the
absence of counsel required a new trial, and noting that "any kind of
presentation to the jury or the judge to help the fact finder determine what the
truth is and assimilate and understand the evidence is itself evidence"). As
evidence, plaintiffs presence on the courtroom must survive scrutiny for
relevancy and unfair prejudice. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 401 (defining the term
"relevant evidence"); FED. R. EvID. 402 (disallowing irrelevant evidence); FED.
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Step 4: Exclusion safeguards. Only if defendants survive
scrutiny during the first three steps can a court then exclude
plaintiffs267 from the liability phase of trial. 268 At this point, a trial
court can exercise its discretion regarding a request for an
accommodation such as closed-circuit television. 269 Plaintiffs who
cannot even understand that a trial has begun, for their sake, may
not benefit from closed-circuit television viewing, but neither
would such an offer cause any harm. Should defendant win the
motion to exclude plaintiff, plaintiffs attorney or expert witnesses
should have the opportunity, upon request, to explain to the jury
why plaintiff will not appear at trial .27 The court itself could offer
the explanation, to give the jury the impression that plaintiff might
have wanted to attend trial. One unusual safeguard consists of
having a plaintiff who will not attend trial meet briefly with
R. EvID. 403 (excluding relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury .. ")
For the above reasons, plaintiffs cannot avoid a discussion of
evidentiary rules. Plaintiff cannot claim simultaneously that exclusion violates
his rights to present a full case, and that his presence should be allowed because
he will not prejudice the jury. Plaintiff's absence could violate his rights if and
only if his presence, by itself, would affect the outcome of a trial. If, in contrast,
plaintiff presence would have absolutely no impact on a jury, then who cares
whether an incapacitated plaintiff with nothing to contribute attends or not?
267 EPET never will apply to the next friends or guardians ad litem-if they had
standing to bring the suit, then they can stay for all proceedings.
268 No cases in the history of plaintiff exclusion ever suggested that plaintiff
exclusion should extend to the damages phase of a trial. See, e.g., Morley v.
Super. Ct., 638 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ariz. 1981). For the purposes of developing
EPET for the phase of trial discussed most extensively in the case law-the
liability phase of trial-this article will not challenge that principle.
Nonetheless, whether plaintiff's presence could induce a jury to overestimate the
size of a damages award merits further discussion.
269 See Bendectin, 857 F.2d at 325 (offering minor plaintiffs excluded from trial
a closed-circuit television viewing).
270 The Morley court noted further that "jurors are less likely to believe a
lawyer's explanation for a client's absence than a medical expert's explanation.
There is no reason to chance misleading the jury." Morley, 638 P.2d at 1335.
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members of the prospective jury pool. 271 Letting potential jurors
meet plaintiff at such an early phase would allow defense attorneys
to know immediately which potential jurors might react too
strongly to graphic injuries.272 This tactic helps defendant not by
shielding the jury from prejudice, but rather by helping defense
counsel make more judicious use of challenges for cause and
273peremptory challenges. Whatever the form, some explanation
for plaintiffs absence will prevent the jury from inferring that
271 Prior cases have employed this safeguard. See Rubert-Torres ex rel. Cintron-
Rupert v. Hosp. San Pablo, Inc., 205 F.3d 472, 476 (1st Cir. 2000).
272 Bringing plaintiff into the courtroom during jury selection also might
counterbalance some of the tactics that plaintiff attorneys use to pick, some of
which would appear offensive in any other context. For example, officially trial
attorneys may not use peremptory challenges to eliminate prospective jurors on
the basis of race. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328 (2003)
(reiterating a three-part test that the U.S. Supreme Court uses to determine
whether a peremptory challenge violated the Equal Protection Clause); But see,
e.g., Walter K. Olson, Courting Stupidity: Why Smart Lawyers Pick Dumb
Jurors, REASON, Jan. 1, 2003, at 22 (noting that attorneys in jury selection use
manuals telling them that women are prejudiced against women whose
attractiveness they envy, that Mexican-American jurors are "passive," and that
"Orientals . . . tend to go along with the majority"; noting also that U.S.
Supreme Court prohibitions on such conduct are difficult to enforce).
Peremptory challenges based on religious beliefs appear to enjoy more support.
See, e.g., United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510-11 (3d Cir. 2003)
(adopting Seventh Circuit analysis distinguishing religious affiliation from
religious beliefs, and allowing peremptory challenges "on the basis of a belief
that would prevent him from basing his decision on the evidence and
instructions, even if the belief had a religious backing .. "); Jeff Johnson, Trial
Lawyers Question Jurors' "Strong Religious Beliefs, " Cybercast News Service,
Dec. 18, 2003 (on file with author) (describing how the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America has issued a new guide for trial lawyers that warns them
about potential jurors with "traditional family values" and "strong religious
beliefs").
2" Having plaintiff meet prospective jurors strikes a balance between plaintiff s
to meet the jury and defendant's desire to exclude plaintiff entirely, but courts
granting this safeguard must be careful that it doesn't undermine any subsequent
exclusion.
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plaintiff is not interested in attending her own trial. 274 At the same
time, the explanation will have to avoid detailing plaintiff's
injuries, to prevent the jury from imagining that the injuries are
more severe than they are.275  Plaintiffs attorney can explain
simply that plaintiff will not appear for the first half of trial,
pursuant to the rules of trial procedure for that case.
Together, the safeguards that exist in EPET will make
exclusion difficult, though not impossible.27 6 EPET will protect
plaintiffs277 in negligence cases from reflexive motion practice,
while forcing both sides to recognize the fundamental interests in a
fair trial that lie behind the positions that they advance
274 See Morley, 638 P.2d at 1335 (describing the court's agreement with
plaintiff's concern that "[t]he jury will be left to speculate as to the reasons for
[Morley's] absence and may well infer that he either has something to hide or
simply isn't interested in the litigation") (alteration in original).
275 See id. ("No prejudice will result to the City of Scottsdale so long as
petitioners' witness is limited to explaining the nature of Paul Morley's
condition as it relates to his inability to testify and does not add gratuitous
details of Morley's condition aimed at prejudicing the jury.").
276 For example, EPET and even Helminski would have allowed plaintiff in
Jordan to attend her trial. Some question existed whether plaintiff could
respond to her environment with the help of a laptop computer. See Jordan ex
rel. Jordan v. Deery, 778 N.E.2d 1264, 1266 n.3 (Ind. 2002) (raising a question
as to whether plaintiff could communicate with counsel with the help of a laptop
computer). Where a court cannot resolve such a question definitively, it should
give plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt.
277 This article has assumed that plaintiff would be the party excluded, and that
bifurcation or exclusion would hurt plaintiff. This article will not address those
rare circumstances when plaintiff is not the target of the exclusion, or when
bifurcation and exclusion together would hurt defendant. See, e.g., Moss v.
Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 25-26 (3d Cir. 1965) (overruling
defendant's protest that bifurcation prevented him from presenting his injuries to
a jury, which he needed to do to balance the sympathy that the jury would feel
for the two plaintiff widows); Luther A. Granquist, Unlawful Discrimination or
a Necessity for a Fair Trial?: Exclusion of a Law Clerk with a Disability from
the Courtroom During Jury Trial of a Personal Injury Case, 30 WM. MrrCHELL
L. REv. 455, 480 (2003) (noting that a recent case in Minnesota denied
plaintiff's request to exclude the judge's law clerk from the courtroom, where
the clerk had a more severe disability than plaintiff and where the jury allegedly
reasoned that plaintiff deserved no award if a more severely disabled person
could work).
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empirically.27 8 This article does not argue that all plaintiffs should
be excluded,279 or that any given plaintiff should be excluded.28 °
Rather, like a gag order for a high-profile trial, plaintiff exclusion
should remain one of many tools that trial judges can use to
balance the "substantial rights of the parties."28' Balancing
278 Cf LEE G. BOLMAN AND TERRENCE E. DEAL, REFRAMING ORGANIZATIONS:
ARTISTRY, CHOICE, AND LEADERSHIP 187 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that "positional
bargaining," the practice of staking out a position and then retreating from it
reluctantly, misses opportunities to create an agreement that helps both parties).
279 Although this article does not call for a per se rule of plaintiff exclusion in
bifurcated trials, the author concedes that the arguments marshaled herein could
support an argument for such a rule. After all, none of the exclusion motions
judged so far under the Helminski test would have had a different outcome under
EPET, and EPET would serve primarily to reaffirm the Helminski test. The lack
of change in any prior outcomes may prompt the question of how, or under what
circumstances, graphic injuries would not raise the risk of jury prejudice. The
answer to that question may lie in a court's subjective assessment of whether a
reasonable juror would have had any routine exposure to the type of injury that
plaintiff suffers. A broken arm in a sling, for example, should not by itself
disturb any reasonable juror. On the other hand, no one except veteran surgeons
or military physicians would have routine exposure to conditions such as
elephantiasis from radiation exposure, head trauma that required partial skull
removal, comas that require hookup to several life support machines, accident
trauma that distorts facial features, etc.
What to do then, about any future attempt to argue for a per se rule of
exclusion? For now, standing firm against exclusion without an expressed
concern about prejudice should suffice. Nonetheless, this article will leave open
the possibility that a per se rule may be necessary someday, as an extreme
measure to protect defendants' due process rights, if plaintiffs' position at trial
continues to strengthen unchecked through developments such as the expansion
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. See supra note 9.
280 See, e.g., Galloway v. Super. Ct., 816 F. Supp. 12, 18 (D.D.C. 1993) ("Yet,
just as no per se rule of exclusion should be employed against blind persons who
wish to serve as jurors, no per se rule of inclusion should apply either.")
281 Freeman, supra note 152, at 119 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 78 (2003)).
Oklahoma statutes also prohibit reversal of trial court judgments unless a
miscarriage of justice would result. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 3001.1 (2004)
("No judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted by any appellate court of
this state in any case, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of the jury
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plaintiff and defendant rights at the trial level also will help
determine the appropriate amount of appellate scrutiny.
28 2
Ultimately, if we can "trust the jury,"283 then surely we can trust
the judge, too.
PART VII: CONCLUSION
Plaintiff exclusion jurisprudence has grown substantially in
its complexity since its debut at the turn of the twentieth century.
In a sense, plaintiff exclusion evolved as society did, addressing
new issues like cognition when society forced the courts to do so-
through the rise of modem medicine, for example. As passage of
the ADA demonstrated, society must not grow coarse and exclude
plaintiffs simply because of who they are. Still, concern for the
disabled does not need to come at the expense of defendants.
Through the modifications to the Helminski test proposed in EPET,
plaintiff exclusion jurisprudence can continue to meet the
challenges of twenty-first century litigation, and continue to ensure
a fair trial to all parties who come before the courts.
or for error in any matter of pleading or procedure, unless it is the opinion of the
reviewing court that the error complained of has probably resulted in a
miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or
statutory right.").
282 See Freeman, supra note 152, at 118 (noting that plaintiff in Cary had no
recollection of his accident, meaning that he had nothing to contribute to the
trial, and that, in turn, his exclusion could satisfy Oklahoma's abuse of
discretion standard); cf Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152
(1999) (instructing federal appellate courts to apply the abuse of discretion
standard to trial court decisions to exclude evidence).283 Sokol, supra note 4, at 227.
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